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We construct a price, dividend, and earnings series for the Industrials sector, the Utilities sector, and the
Railroads sector from the beginning of the 1870s until the beginning of the year 2013 from primary sources. To
infer about mispricings in the sector markets over more than a century, we investigate the forecasting power of
the Cyclically Adjusted Price-Earnings (CAPE) ratio1 for these sectors. With regard to the CAPE ratio, which
has originally been devised and employed by Campbell and Shiller (1988, 1998, 2001) as well as Shiller (2005),
we define a methodological improvement to this ratio to not only be robust to inflationary changes, but also to
changes in corporate payout policy. We then update the original evidence from Campbell and Shiller (1998, 2001)
of the return predictability of the CAPE ratio for the overall stock market and furthermore extend this evidence
to the three aforementioned sectors individually. Whereas this part of our analysis focuses on each sector of the
US economy in isolation, we subsequently construct an indicator from the CAPE ratio that enables us to perform
valuation comparisons across sectors. In addition to establishing the prediction of subsequent return differences
based on differences in the CAPE-based valuation indicator, we also suggest a hypothetical, historical, and simple
value investment strategy that rotates between the three sectors based on the valuation signals derived from the
CAPE-based indicator, generating slightly more than 1.09% annualized, inflation-adjusted excess total return over
the market benchmark during a period of nearly 110 years.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The Cyclically Adjusted Price-Earnings Ratio and Price Fluctuations
There is a substantial literature on the value factor in predicting returns, but this literature has not yet exploited
the historically-longest available stock price series, sector indices. Studying the very-long-term value effect with these
series allows us to test the value proposition out of its original sample, where out of sample means extending the
sample back in time, as well as forward. The long time series enables us to evaluate a very effective measure of
mispricing relative to fundamentals, the Cyclically Adjusted Price-Earnings (CAPE) ratio,2 originally shown to be
highly effective in predicting returns in the aggregate US stock market by Campbell and Shiller (1988), who did not,
however, look at sector data. Sector data, in contrast to firm-level data, is especially interesting because the sectors
represent major, almost macroeconomic, activities, and much analysis, accordingly probably also much mispricing,
is sector-related. It is also interesting since we can accurately evaluate a sector’s valuation over a longer historical
period than has previously been studied in the literature.
Subsequent to Campbell and Shiller (1988), the CAPE ratio has been employed by Campbell and Shiller (1998),
Campbell and Shiller (2001), and Shiller (2005). In the analyses since the late 1990s, it has been defined as the ratio
of real (inflation-corrected) per-share price divided by a long average of real earnings per share.3 Our present analysis
modifies the definition of the CAPE ratio from Campbell and Shiller (1998), Campbell and Shiller (2001), and Shiller
(2005) and considers the ratio real total return per-share price divided by a long average of real scaled earnings per
share, where the scaling of earnings takes into account the transition from price return to total return numbers.
In the original analyses, it was concluded that when the average of earnings is taken over the past ten years, the
ratio is a significant forecaster of long-term, ten-year stock market returns. When the ratio has been high (i.e., stocks
are overpriced) prices tend to come down, not necessarily in the next year or two, but some time over the next ten
years, and conversely when the ratio is low. The CAPE ratio differs from the conventional price earnings ratio in
that earnings are measured over a much longer interval, and because of the longer-term view they are necessarily
inflation-adjusted. The longer interval appears justified, since the earnings in any given year tend to be noisy and
influenced by the business cycle. The idea of using price relative to a long average of earnings was not new with
Campbell and Shiller (though, it appears that the inflation adjustment was new and important). As long ago as 1934,
Benjamin Graham and David Dodd advocated a ratio that is an analogue to CAPE in their classic book Graham
and Dodd (1934):
“A conservative valuation of a stock issue must bear a reasonable relation to average earnings. In
addition it must be justified by whatever indications are available as to the future. This approach shifts
the original point of departure, or basis of computation, from the current earnings to the average earnings,
which should cover a period of not less than five years, and preferably seven to ten years.”4
The Graham and Dodd book was very widely read and influential, and it is reputed to have inspired a young Warren
Buffett into his subsequent stellar investing career. But this ratio, which Graham and Dodd used in the inverse form
and called “average earnings on common stock price” was never much picked up. Little mention of it is made in
subsequent discussions. It is true that Barron’s published a “ratio price to five-year average earnings” for its Barron’s
50-Stock Average5 since the 1950s, but that ratio seems not to have been much noticed, at least in media accounts.
The idea of examining a long average of earnings was not original with Graham and Dodd either, as it goes back
another couple of decades. In 1911, the Wall Street Journal6 published an “Index of Railroad Earnings Covering
a Ten-Year Period” and suggested that the stock price should be evaluated using this index. Certainly, intuitive
analysts looking at earnings data will quickly recognize that any single year’s earnings is very noisy, and one needs
2The CAPE ratio described here and commonly quoted should not be confused with the “cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio” of
Smithers and Wright (2002), a completely different ratio that seems to have faded from view. Even in that book, the central ratio was
the so called “q ratio.”
3Campbell and Shiller (1988) defined the CAPE ratio as the arithmetic long average of the natural logarithm of real earnings per share
minus the natural logarithm of real per-share price.
4See Graham and Dodd (1934), page 459.
5For example, see Barron’s (2012).
6See N.N. (1911).
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to look at the longer history of earnings. And yet the price earnings ratio that is most commonly quoted is just the
price divided by 12-month trailing earnings.
Why has the price-earnings ratio been so durable, despite the fact that such personages as Graham and Dodd
dismiss it? The reason may have to do with the fact that the ratio is not always available at the firm level. Many
firms are less than ten years old. Because it cannot always be provided, standard printouts of characteristics of
individual stocks are likely to omit such a ratio. Moreover, at the firm level, we have to recognize that there may
often be special factors that limit the meaning of earnings of as far as ten years ago. The most obvious example is
for firms that are still young, even if more than ten years old, and their earnings show a growth trajectory. A CAPE
ratio for an individual firm cannot have the same universality, and so it loses the currency of the conventional CAPE.
A CAPE ratio for an individual stock seems to need more judgment to interpret, and hence seems to recommend
itself only to professional analysts, who often like to keep their important indicators to themselves. In Shiller (2012a),
it was argued that investors show an “impulse for conventionality and familiarity.” The conventional price-earnings
ratio, based on just a year’s earnings, is everywhere, and so, by this impulse, may be seen as more trustworthy.
1.2 Historic Sector Rotation Based on the Cyclically Adjusted Price-Earnings Ratio
In the subsequent analysis, we consider the CAPE ratio on the level of sectors, instead of the firm level. Naturally, we
face the question about applying the CAPE ratio to sector indices of stock prices (along with other fundamentals),
since the stocks that comprise the indices change through time. There is a risk that the earnings of as far as ten
years ago might not even be representative of earnings of the companies that are now in the index. However, we
take the view of an investor who would like to determine its exposure to certain sectors and for that purpose would
like to make use of a long-term valuation ratio like the CAPE ratio, as applied to individual sectors. Therefore, the
composition of the underlying sector is only a subordinated concern for this investor, secondary to more global trends
of a subset of the overall stock market.
Looking at individual sectors substantially extends the original purpose of the CAPE ratio as initially defined by
Campbell and Shiller (1988) as a means to determine the over- and undervaluation of the stock market as a whole.
For this purpose, we define an extension of the CAPE ratio for individual sectors, the Relative CAPE indicator,
which normalizes the CAPE ratio of a sector relative to its own long-term history and therefore enables comparisons
of the over- and undervaluation signals of the CAPE ratio across sectors.
In our long-term analysis of the CAPE ratio when applied to individual sectors, we consider data from the early
1870s until the end of the year 2012 for the sectors “Industrials”, “Utilities”, and “Railroads” in the United States. In
addition, we also replicate our construction for the overall stock market to obtain a market benchmark for reference
purposes. We merge data from Cowles (1939) with data from the Security Price Index Record publications by the
Standard & Poor’s Statistical Service,7 whereby we supplement the Security Price Index Record’s information with
data from the Analysts’ Handbook, which is also published by the Standard & Poor’s Statistical Service.8 Our goal
has been the construction of a US-only sector-specific time series for prices, dividends, and earnings that reaches as
far back in time as possible. This has naturally led us to the three sectors Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads because
of the availability of data about them in the early phase of our sample. Subsequently, we have aimed to trace exactly
these three sectors, in order to be able to investigate the effectiveness of the CAPE ratio (or the Relative CAPE
indicator) as a long-term valuation measure over a very long period of time.
Analogous to the findings of Campbell and Shiller (1988, 1998, 2001) for the overall stock market, we initially
extend the evidence in favor of the predictive ability of the CAPE ratio for long-term returns to the sector level.
Subsequently, we turn our attention to the ability of the Relative CAPE indicator to make predictions for return
differences between sectors. Lastly, we translate the predictive evidence about the CAPE ratio and the Relative
CAPE indicator into a hypothetical investment strategy. This strategy rotates between Industrials, Utilities, and
7See Standard and Poor’s Statistical Service (1978-2010). The information contained in the multiple volumes of this publication that
we use for the construction of our data has originally been collected by Standard Statistics, which in 1941 merges with Poor’s Publishing
to form the Standard & Poor’s Corporation. For brevity, we will refer to ”Standard & Poor’s” as publishers of the Security Price Index
Record for the entire time period over which we use this data.
8See Standard and Poor’s Statistical Service (1982-2012). The same disclaimer related to the use of the term “Standard & Poor’s” as
in footnote 7 applies.
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Railroads according to signals obtained from the Relative CAPE indicator, which is complemented with a momentum
signal that we design to be of subordinated importance to the value signal provided by CAPE. We find that the real
(inflation-adjusted) total return of this deliberately simplistic strategy that only rotates between three different assets
beats the real total return on the Standard & Poor’s Composite Index in a time span between October 1902 until
the beginning of the first quarter of 2013 by an annualized 109 basis points or 1.09%.9 In other words, whereas the
benchmark turns $1 (in inflation-adjusted terms) in October 1902 into nearly $569 (in inflation-adjusted term) in
January 2013, our strategy results in approximately $1,756 (again adjusted for inflation).
2 Construction of Price, Dividend, and Earnings Data
2.1 Overview of the Employed Time Series
The process to create the time series of prices, dividends, and earnings for the three sectors as well as for the overall
market is generally identical, which is why we will describe it in a generic manner. We aim to construct four different
time series, an end-of-quarter price index, a beginning-of-quarter price index, a dividend series, and an earnings
series. The following description outlines the key characteristics of our data, whereas we defer a detailed analysis and
discussion of the construction to Appendix A.10
We use data from Cowles (1939) for the early part of our sample. We then transition to the Security Price Index
Record published by Standard & Poor’s Statistical Service11 for prices and earnings after the end of 1925, whereas
the dividend data from Cowles (1939) is in use until the end of 1934.12. The Security Price Index Record is in
use for our price series until its latest current volume, which is the 2010 volume. Price data for the last few years
of the sample are from Bloomberg. Because the Security Price Record has ceased the publication of earnings and
dividend information for the Railroads sector in 1982 and for the overall stock market as well as the Industrials and
the Utilties sector in the third quarter of 2001, we need to switch to an accompanying Standard & Poor’s publication,
the Analysts’s Handbook.13
The constructed price indices have quarterly frequency and are designed to reflect the price level of each sector14
in the beginning and at the end of each quarter. The end-of-quarter series runs from the end of the fourth quarter
of 1872 until the end of fourth quarter of 2012, whereas the beginning-of-quarter series starts in the beginning of the
first quarter of 1873 and ends in the beginning of the first quarter of 2013.15 Starting in 1930 for Railroads and in
1932 for the other sectors, the end-of-quarter series refers to the index value at the end of the last trading day of the
month. In comparison, the beginning-of-quarter series uses the end of the first trading day of the quarter. Before
1930 and 1932, respectively, we use approximations for the end and the beginning of the quarter that we describe in
detail in Appendix A. We normalize all price, dividends, and earnings data such that the nominal price index at the
end of the fourth quarter of 1872 equals $1.
In contrast to the two price series, the dividend series measures a payment flow that has accrued over a specific
period of time. It also has quarterly frequency and, at the end of each quarter, it expresses the amount of dividends
that an investor will have received from a sector during this quarter. The earnings series shares the notion with the
dividend series of measuring a flow variable. However, each observation of the earnings series captures a 12-month
9The volatility performance of the two strategies is less than 0.5% apart from each other, i.e. the volatility of the two strategies is
nearly identical.
10Global Financial Data, see Global Financial Data (2012), contains similar data series to the one that we construct from primary
sources. In order to have full control over the conventions used in the construction of the data, we have decided to start from the primary
sources, particularly because the documentation of the data on Global Financial Data has not provided sufficient detail to be able to
comprehend their data construction.
11See Standard and Poor’s Statistical Service (1978-2010).
12For an elaboration on our motives behind the choice of these transition dates, please consult the detailed data description in Appendix
A.
13See Standard and Poor’s Statistical Service (1982-2012).
14As already mentioned above, we will construct both price series, the dividend series, and the earnings series for Industrials, Utilities,
and Railroads as well as for the overall stock market, which will be represented by the S&P Composite Index. For brevity, we will refer
to the three sectors in conjunction with the overall market as “sectors” in the description of the construction of the data.
15Technically, our price data starts in the beginning of January 1871. However, the first earnings observation that is uniformly available
across all sectors under consideration is for December 1872, which we have therefore chosen as the overall beginning of our sample.
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trailing sum of earnings for a sector. Its observations are annual from 1872 until 1934 and switch to quarterly
frequency starting with the end of the first quarter of 1935.16
An important feature of our data is the lack of interpolated data for dividends and earnings.17 Dividend data
at the end of each quarter has actually occurred during this quarter and earnings information refers to the actual
earnings that have accumulated in the past twelve months. Particularly for the kind of predictability analysis that
we perform later on, it is crucial not to rely on interpolated data. Moreover, another crucial feature of our data is an
emphasis on spot information for the price indices.18
Because more precise information is not available otherwise, the monthly price data from Cowles (1939) reports
the arithmetic average of a month’s high and low price. In contrast, the data from Standard and Poor’s Statistical
Service (1978-2010) report actual index levels at the end of a trading day. We therefore switch from the averaged data
in Cowles (1939) to the actual spot information in Standard and Poor’s Statistical Service (1978-2010) at the earliest
possible date, which is 1926, to minimize the impact of the data averaging for our later predictability analysis.19
2.2 Construction of Total Return Series
The purpose of the dividend series is to turn the price indices (end-of-quarter and beginning-of-quarter) of a sector
into total return indices. These indexes represent the value of a portfolio, started at $1 in the case of the end-of-
quarter series,20 reinvesting all dividends into the same sector. Or, alternatively, the indexes may be thought of as
showing the value through time of a share in the sector if it had used share repurchase instead of dividends to make
the same cash flow to investors as it in fact did make, so that the investor got exactly the same cash flow, but called
share repurchase rather than dividends, and saw the number of shares owned decline through time. Following Miller
and Modigliani (1961), we see that the total return index is a valid way of representing the value of a stock, though
the index will tend to grow faster than does the size of the business activities. Using total return indices for our
analysis eliminates any anomalies due to changes in payout ratios to earnings over the long time interval of our data.
Explicitly, we construct the total return index for the end-of-quarter series as follows: We set the index to $1 at
the end of the fourth quarter of 1872, which is the value of the end-of-quarter price index at this instance. Then, we
obtain each value of the total return index at the end of quarter t + 1 by multiplying the total return index at the




where Pt and Pt+1 denote the level of the original price index at the end of quarters t and t+ 1 respectively and
Dt+1 denotes the dividend series at the end of quarter t+1, which stands for the payments that accrue during quarter
t + 1. In other words, we reinvest dividends quarterly and perform the hypothetical reinvestment consideration at
the end of the quarter for all dividends that have accrued during the quarter.
The procedure for the beginning-of-quarter series is very similar, although it requires some clarification with regard
to the timing of the dividend stream. As we construct the beginning-of-quarter price index to reflect the price of the
sector in the very beginning of the quarter, the time period covered between two consecutive beginning-of-quarter
observations is, up to minimal differences, identical to the time period covered between the end of the previous quarter
and the end of the current quarter. Therefore, we set the beginning-of-quarter total return series index to the level
of the price index in the beginning of the first quarter of 1873 and obtain each value of the total return index in the
beginning of quarter t+ 1 by multiplying the total return index in the beginning of quarter t by the ratio
16Despite the switch in frequency for the earnings series, it is important to keep in mind that the convention of the 12-month trailing
sum remains unchanged.
17This is in contrast to the online data to be found at Shiller (2012b), which are updated numbers from the data used in Shiller (2005).
18This is again in contrast to the online data to be found at Shiller (2012b). That price series contains the average of the month’s high
and low price for the part of the data that comes from Cowles (1939) and the average of all prices recorded on trading days throughout
a month in the later part of the sample.
19See Working (1960) for the impact of averaging on the autocorrelation of a time series.
20The beginning-of-quarter series starts at a minimally different value reflecting price appreciation or depreciation between the end of
the fourth quarter of 1872 and the beginning of the first quarter of 1873.




where P ′t and P ′t+1 denote the level of the original price index in the beginning of quarters t and t+1 respectively
and Dt denotes the dividend series at the end of quarter t, which stands for the payments that accrue during quarter
t. This procedure preserves the convention of reinvesting dividends quarterly at the end of the time period, during
which they accrue.
2.3 Inflation Adjustment
Because of the length of the time period that we consider, it is necessary to adjust each time series that we use in
our subsequent analysis, i.e. the price indices and the total return series as well as the earnings series, for inflation.
In order to do so, we use a price series that has already been employed in Shiller (2005)21 to adjust data spanning an
analogous time period for the impact of inflation. Starting in 1913, the price series is the Consumer Price Index for
All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), which is published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Before 1913, data comes
from a producer price index in Warren and Pearson (1935).22
Importantly, at any moment in time, we would like to avoid using data that has not been made available at that
moment in time. As the time series that we use for inflation-adjustment will naturally be published with a lag, we
have decided to impose a lag in our inflation-adjustment. That is, in order to adjust any value from any of our
price indices, total return series and earnings series that is listed in a particular month, irrespective of whether the
time series refers to the beginning or the end of the quarter, we lag the inflation-adjustment series by three months.
For example, a number listed in December 1955 will be adjusted by the CPI-U from September 1955. Finally, the
common price level, to which we refer when we use the term “real” is September 2012.
2.4 Logarithmic Convention
In all our subsequent plots, we employ a logarithmic scale, with e as its base value, a scale that gives equal vertical
axis intervals to equal percentage changes. This change is another tribute to the length of our sample, which covers
well more than a century. The logarithmic scale represents economic growth more evenly throughout the time period
that we consider, as it avoids skewed impressions about the long-term behavior of time series, as these differences
may potentially be due to century-long compounding of small differences early in the sample.
3 Historic Sector Classification of the US Economy
3.1 Standard & Poor’s Sector Classifications
When constructing our sector dataset, our goal has been to use a sector classification that is not only consistent
throughout a long period of time, but also has a long history of publicly reported data on prices, dividends, and
earnings. This has naturally led us to the distinction between Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads, a classification
employed by both Cowles (1939) and during a substantial part of the period covered by the Security Price Index
Record. Overall, this classification persisted from the beginning of the 1870s until 1982. In 1982, Standard & Poor’s
decided to cease their reporting for Railroads as one of the main sectors of the US economy, as represented by the S&P
500.23 Instead, S&P commenced to report prices, dividends, and earnings for Transportation, of which Railroads are
a part, and Financials.24 Another change in the sector classification system used by S&P came in August 1999, when
21See also the online data section at Shiller (2012b).
22See Table 1 on pages 11-14 in Warren and Pearson (1935).
23March 1957 is the inception date for the S&P500. Before that, Cowles (1939) and Standard & Poor’s report an S&P Composite Index
that consists of less than 500 stocks.
24See, for example, the information provided in the sector-specific data tables and the introductory history section in the 2004 volume
of Standard and Poor’s Statistical Service (1978-2010).
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S&P, in collaboration with Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), issued the Global Industry Classification
Standard (GICS). On the top-level, the so-called sector-level, this classification system consists of ten sectors. Energy,
Materials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Information Technology, and Telecommunication
Services, which were previously part of what was referred to as Industrials, are now considered separate sectors. The
remainder of the previous Industrials sector is now paired with the former Transportation sector to form the GICS
sector Industrials. Finally, Utilities and Financials have kept their status as separate sectors.25
Instead of reflecting the most up-to-date sector classification, our goal when constructing our historic sector
dataset has been to trace the performance of the original three sectors Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads through
time and provide a consistent and very long-term assessment of these sectors’ performance for nearly one and a half
centuries. This is why we disregard the introduction of Transportation and Financials as novel top-level distinctions
of the US economy in 198226 and the inception of the GICS classification in 1999 and preserve the distinction between
Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads. Given the novelty of the GICS classification, barely enough time has passed in
order to compute a few years worth of CAPE ratios from publicly available data for the sectors according to this
classification, which renders a meanignful long-term analysis of the CAPE ratio as a valuation tool infeasible.
Instead of tracing a sector classification through time while relying on publicly available aggregate data, as it is
done in this paper, another feasible approach is to start from a recent and up-to-date sector classification, as for
example the GICS classification, and extend this classification as far back in time as possible by constructing the
appropriate time series from disaggregate information. See Ural et al. (2012) for a construction of GICS-based sector
indices within the universe of the S&P500 from individual-firm data, which are then analyzed using the CAPE ratio.
Naturally, the limited availability of data leads to a much shorter sample period to analyze, e.g. CAPE ratios in Ural
et al. (2012) only cover approximately 30 years compared to the almost 130 years in this paper.
3.2 Universe of Stocks for Sector Indices
An important consideration relates to the universe of stocks, from which the sector-specific information about Indus-
trials, Utilities, and Railroads is derived. Cowles (1939) covers the time period from the beginning of the 1870s until
well into the middle of the first half of the twentieth century. Wilson and Jones (1987) in their table A.127 provide
information about the universe, within which Cowles (1939) reports the price, dividend, and earnings information
for the overall stock market as well as for Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads. Whereas the universe only consists
of about 50 stocks in the early 1870s, decomposed into about two thirds of Railroad stocks, a tenth of Utilities, and
the remainder in Industrials, the stock universe increases to nearly 400 stocks by the middle of the first half of the
twentieth century. Both Railroads and Utilities now make up slightly less than a tenth of the universe each, with
Industrials representing the remaining portion.28
With regard to the transition from the data in Cowles (1939) to the data from the Security Price Index Record,
Cowles (1939) explicitly describes in Sections 2 and 4 that the index information is designed to be merged with the
data from the Security Price Index Record, however with what he refers to as the “weekly indices”. Whereas these
weekly indices cover a universe of approximately 400 stocks during the later part of the first half of the 20th century,
Standard Statistics also publishes indices based on a so-called “daily series”.29 The universe for this daily index data
is only 90 stocks, 50 Industrials, 20 Utilities, and 20 Railroads.
Standard & Poor’s has actually later standardized all their indices to reflect the information from the daily series,
and therefore has eliminated the weekly indices. This procedural overhaul only affects the early data from the Security
Price Index Record, because the universe has been standardized to 500 stocks after the inception of the S&P500 in
1957. This shift is something that has been explicitly mentioned in the methodological section of the Security Price
25For a current overview of the GICS classification system, see Standard and Poor’s (2012).
26Whereas the subsequent analysis of the main part focuses on consistency and and a long-term perspective on sectors of the US economy,
Appendix D contains an illustration of the hypothetical investment strategy, which will be described later, if one indeed eliminates the
Railroads sector as an independent investment and introduces Transportation and Financials instead.
27This table summarizes information contained in Appendix II of Cowles (1939).
28For the remainder of this section, it is important to keep in mind that, although the number of stocks can give an indication of the
relative importance of sectors, the relevant quantity to compare would be market capitalization. However, neither Cowles (1939) nor
Standard and Poor’s Statistical Service (1978-2010) contain this information.
29See also the discussion in Wilson and Jones (2002) about the very same matter.
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Index Record until the volume for 1992, but has been edited in later volumes. In summary, whereas Cowles (1939)
considers a universe of approximately 400 stocks with the explicit intention to merge the data with the weekly index
data from the Security Price Index Record, our information from Standard & Poor’s only reflects 90 stocks until
March 1957.
We would like to make two comments about this drop in the size of the universe under consideration. First,
whereas the drop from 400 to 90 might sound big, the drop in market capitalization reflected by the indices will
for sure have been less dramatic. Along the same lines, the 90 stocks included in the daily series have been chosen
with the explicit intention to reflect the US stock market to the closest degree possible, which is why a potential lack
of representativeness arising from the decreased stock universe is not too much of a concern. Moreover, it becomes
apparent from studying the historic precedents of the Security Price Index Record during parts of the relevant time
period30 that the dividend and earnings information contained in these volumes actually refers to the 90-stock daily
series and not to 400-stock weekly indices. Taking into account that we need prices in connection to dividends and
earnings, this actually means that we would not have had a choice anyway but to refer to the 90-stock series.
After 1957, all series build on a universe of those 500 stocks that are part of the S&P 500.31 Initially, the
composition was fixed to 425 Industrials, 60 Utilities, and 15 Railroads, which was later adapted to 400 Industrials,
40 Utilities, 20 Transportation (of which Railroads are a part), and 40 Financials. The fixed breakdown of the 500
stocks into sectors was abandoned in April 1988, when S&P adopted a flexible structure of the sectors within the
S&P500.
Our focus on sectors within the US economy is the major distinguishing element to the data under consideration
in Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1976), Wilson and Jones (1987), Schwert (1990), Goetzmann et al. (2000), and Wilson
and Jones (2002), which all exclusively focus on the overall US stock market, and also from the analysis in Jorion
and Goetzmann (1999), who look at overall stock markets on an international level.
3.3 Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads through Time
The three sectors at the start of the sample represent three quite distinct economic activities in the United States.
At the beginning of our sample, the large conglomerate corporation, in many lines of business, was yet to come, so
companies could be neatly divided into separate industries. The clarity of this division however diminishes somewhat
through time.
Railroads are the best defined of the three, a single kind of transportation service that until the 1920s dominated
land transportation, and dominated the stock market as well. Today it is still a clearly defined consistent industry,
though it has lost some of its fundamental elements, notably passenger transportation (taken over in 1971 by the
U.S. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, doing business as Amtrak, which is de facto practically a government
agency) and mail service, also largely discontinued after 1971.32 Their relative importance within the overall stock
market has also declined over time. As outlined above, whereas two-thirds of the stocks of the S&P Composite Index
were Railroads in the beginning of the 1870s, only 15 out of 500 stocks were Railroads when the S&P 500 index
started in 1957. Nowadays, it is a level-four GICS classification, a so-called sub-industry. Its index consists of four
stocks, Burlington Northern Santa Fe Company, CSX Corporation, Norfolk Southern Corporation, and Union Pacific
Corporation.33
Utilities define another quite distinct sector. According to the Cowles classification, before 1940, the Utilities
sector represented electric, gas, water and heat operating companies, as well as telephone and telegraph, and traction
and motor transportation. To a first approximation, this sector represented basic things that one needs to get
arrangements for, and to be billed regularly for, when one moves to a new home, and local transportation to and
from the home. As such, it has, in recent years, gained the reputation as a boring, stable sector, but it was not always
30See Standard Trade and Securities Service (1938-1950).
31For the following description, see, for example, the History section of the 2004 volume of Standard and Poor’s Statistical Service
(1978-2010).
32Some U. S. Postal Service use of railways was begun again in the 1980s, and the U.S. Postal Service has participated in container
shipments as that industry has developed. In 1993 the industry introduced RoadRailer intermodal equipment that could travel both on
highways and railroads. Railroad station post offices were also eliminated by 1977. See United States Postal Service (2012).
33See Standard and Poor’s (2012) for a detailed description of the GICS codes of the constituents of the S&P500.
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so boring. According to GICS, which lists Utilities as one of the ten top-level sectors, Utilities have kept their status
as an important part of the US Economy. It currently consists of Electric Utilities, Gas Utilities, Multi-Utilities,
Water Utilities, as well as Independent Power Producers and Energy Traders. The sector has therefore preserved its
core activities throughout the entire sample period of nearly a century and a half. It has actually become slightly
more focused, as its telecommunication and transportation constituents have migrated into separate sectors.
Industrials, in Cowles classification covering the beginning of our sample, were the catchall sector that included
advertising, agricultural machinery, airplane transportation, apparel, automobiles and trucks and their parts and
accessories, beverages, building equipment, chemicals, coal, containers, copper and brass, cotton and cotton goods,
drugs and cosmetics, electrical equipment, fertilizer, food products, gold mining, household products and supplies,
lead and zinc, leather, machinery and machine equipment, meat packing, mining and smelting, office and business
equipment, oil producing and refining, paper and paper products, radio, phonograph and musical instruments, rayon,
retail trade, shipping and shipbuilding, shoes, silk and silk goods, steel and iron, sugar, theatres and motion pictures,
tobacco, and wool and woolen goods. It quickly grew from representing less then 20 stocks in the Composite Index
in the beginning of the 1870s to representing 425 out of 500 stocks at the inception date of the S&P500, a number
that S&P later reduced to 400. Until the creation of the GICS codes in 1999, Industrials were still listed as a single
sector. As outlined above, the Industrials sector was split into nearly eight sectors,34 covering such diverse companies
like Black & Decker, Nike Incorporated, and Polo Ralph Lauren in the newly minted Consumer Discretionary sector,
eBay Incorporated, Google Incorporated, and Visa Incorporated in the novel Information Technology sector, as well as
Boeing, General Electric Company, and Caterpillar Incorporated in the GICS Industrials sector.35 Our continuation
of what was referred to as Industrials is therefore not the GICS Industrials sector, but the so-called “Industrials
Composite Index”, which is a similar catchall of diverse activities, consisting of all stocks in the S&P500, except for
those that are classified as Utilities, Transportation, or Financials.
In Figure 1, we display the price indices36 for the overall stock market as well as for the three sectors, both in
nominal and real terms. As described at the end of Section 2, we employ a logarithmic scale throughout, as a tribute
to the length of our sample. However, in order to provide a better sense of the performance of the price indices,
we will briefly describe the performance of the different indices over time in non-logarithmic fashion.37 The nominal
index capturing the overall stock market starts at $1 in 1872 and ends up with almost $256, i.e. it increases nearly
256-fold. The real index for the overall stock market ends with the same value by construction.38
It starts however at slightly less than $18, which is the inflation-adjusted equivalent of $1 in 1872, reflecting a
more than 14-fold increase in real terms. The performance of Industrials is even more impressive than that of the
overall stock market. Its nominal price index increases from $1 in 1872 to slightly less than $671 at the end of the
fourth quarter in 2012, which translates into an almost 38-fold increase in real terms. In contrast, the performance of
Utilities is substantially worse over the entire time period. $1 in 1872 turns into just less than $16 at the end of 2012,
which actually turns out to be a decline of nearly 11% in real terms. Railroads, as the final sector that we consider
and display in Figure 1 increases about 167-fold in nominal terms and a little bit more than 9-fold in real terms.
In comparison to Figure 1, Figure 2 displays earnings, the second key component of our long-term valuation
measure CAPE, both in real and in nominal terms. Earnings growth varies between a more than 65% decrease
in inflation-adjusted terms for Utilties and a more than 8-fold, almost 12-fold, and approximately 11-fold inflation-
adjusted increase for the Railroads sector, for the Industrials sector, and the overall stock market, respectively. It
is striking that the earnings growth numbers are roughly comparable to the increases in the index levels and that
no sector ever had negative 12-month trailing earnings. The absence of negative 12-month earnings is particularly
striking for the Railroads sector; this must seem strange to those who remember the many troubles and bankruptcies
34Again, see Standard and Poor’s (2012) for more detailed information about the GICS codes for the constituents of the S&P500.
35As outlined above, the GICS sector Industrials consists of some companies that were classified as Industrials before the advent of the
GICS codes together with the old Transportation sector.
36Note that we use the term ”price indices” to refer to indices that do not reinvest dividends. This is in contrast to “total return indices”,
which are scaled price indices to reflect dividend reinvestment.
37The following description centers on the evolution of the price indices, without taking into account reinvested dividends. We will
however take a look at the total return indices below.
38We use March 2012 as the base month for the inflation adjustment. Because we lag the price level by three months, this is the price
level used for the inflation adjustment of the observation at the end of the second quarter of 2012, which is the end of our sample.
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Figure 1: This figure depicts price indices for the overall US stock market (All Stocks), Industrials, Utilities, and
Railroads, not reinvesting dividends. The data is quarterly with the first observation occuring at the end of the
fourth quarter of 1872 and the last observation at the end of the fourth quarter of 2012. Nominal Data between
1872 and 1925 is taken from series P in the last month of a quarter in Cowles (1939). Between 1926 and 1934,
the quarterly price series refer to the level reported by the Security Price Index Record on the last Wednesday of a
quarter. Starting in 1935, the price index at the end of a quarter refers to the last trading day of a quarter, again
as reported by the Security Price Index Record and complemented by information from the Analysts’ Handbook in
the case of Railroads after 1982. Inflation-adjustment uses the spliced CPI series, as described in Section 2, with
September 2012 as the base month. A nominal number in a given month (end of a quarter) is adjusted using the
level of the CPI three months prior, aiming to ensure that the relevant CPI number is known in the month, for which
the adjustment occurs. All nominal series are normalized to 1 in the fourth quarter of 1872. Both the nominal and
the real series are displayed on a logarithmic scale (natural logarithm).
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Figure 2: These charts display 12-month trailing earnings information for the overall stock market (All Stocks),
Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads. Observations from 1872 until 1934 are annual and constructed from series P and
R in Cowles (1939), as outlined in Appendix A. Starting in 1935, observations are diluted quarterly earnings from
the Security Price Index Record, which we turn into 12-month trailing sums in quarterly frequency. Information for
Railroads after 1982 is from the Analysts’ Handbook published by Standard & Poor’s Statistical Services, which is
the source of all earnings information starting in the fourth quarter of 2001. The procedure for inflation-adjustment is
identical to the one applied to the data in Figure 1. The nominal data is normalized to correspond to the normalization
of the nominal price series to 1 at the end of 1872. As with the price indices in Figure 1, both the nominal and the
real series are displayed on a logarithmic scale (natural logarithm).
of railroads in history, and the complete end to private inter-city passenger service in the U.S. But, we must remember
that freight service grew quite steadily and strongly over this whole period, and that passenger service was ultimately
driven out by competing modes of transportation, by government regulation, and by subsidies to Amtrak, which
could thereby outcompete any private service.
Since our datasets begin at the start of the 1870s, the most of the tumultuous opening decades of the railroad
industry are excluded. Stories of wild speculation in railroad shares, and shameless exploitation by railroad promoters
of naïve investors, began to appear in the 1830s. Notably, there was a remarkable railroad mania in the United
Kingdom which grew through the early 1840s. Railroad prices peaked in late 1845, and then proceeded to lose two
thirds of their value by 1850. Before its burst, the bubble attracted investments from many British luminaries of that
time, including Charles Babbage (the inventor of the computer), Charles Darwin, William Makepeace Thackery, John
Stuart Mill, the Brontë sisters, Benjamin Disraeli, William Gladstone, and Robert Peel. That railroads generated real
excitement among investors then is understandable. Some railroads in the 1840s were routinely clocking peak speeds
of 75 miles per hour in passenger service, which must surely have impressed travelers of that day. One anonymous
writer, a couple decades later, in the 1860s, described the feelings that trains stirred:
“I can never quite get used to the wonder that is ever passing by my door. Some people, I am told,
who have a very fine horse, are, after owning it for years, as proud of its form and its breed as the day
on which they bought it. Some love to look on a picture or a statue their life through, others are always
lifting a favorite author down from a library shelf to read over and again the same old familiar passages,
written in dead or living languages. So I also never can get quite careless and indifferent to the wonder
that is passing my door here day and night,–never get rid of my admiration at the precision of all the
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locomotive’s movements, - never get rid of my astonishment that it comes to me year in, year out, with
almost the regularity of Nature’s workmanship. It is due, and it is soon here; it sets down its living load,
takes up the living, screams to me, “Coming, coming!” and screams to me, “Good bye!” - a wild creature
put into harness by man, the mightiest he has ever controlled, but docile indeed if man uses him wisely.”39
The emotions this author describes sound familiar, like the emotions we feel today with some of our new twenty-first
century gadgets. Railroads were very strong in psychological impact in their time, even to the point of romantification
in art, literature and music. Starting in the 1840s, people began to define the era as “the railway age.” People
grotesquely overrated the importance of the railroad to the economy according to economic historian Robert Fogel.40
The emotions regarding railroads and the essential ambiguity of any investment in changing industries must have
produced repeated mispricings of their stocks, if not outright bubbles. Railroad “manias” later in the 19th century
are described for Argentina, Brazil, China, India and Mexico. But continental Europe is notably absent: throughout
Europe, railroads were government projects, apparently because of continental law and the need to exercise rights of
eminent domain to start a railroad.
According to Cole and Frickey (1928), US railroad prices more than doubled 1843-4, around the time of the UK
bubble, but escaped most of the UK railroad crash in the years after 1845. The big correction in the US railroad
market was not until the panic of 1857. That panic was marked by massive railroad stock declines, which led to failures
of banks which had lent to them, just as much as the crisis of 2008 was tied to declines in mortgage securities. There
was a more than doubling again of railroad prices 1861-4. But at the time our data begins, these most extraordinary
stories of railway manias were history. The panic of 1873, at the very beginning of our sample, is not so tied to
railroads. This panic is tied by historians to Jim Fisk’s and Jay Gould’s machinations 1866-8 with Erie Railroad
stock, but our data do not show a major collapse of railroad prices in 1873, as can be seen from Figure 1 displaying
price indices and Figure 2 displaying the associated earnings series. Railroads by the beginning of our sample had
become a mature industry, as a rather dominant part of a larger economy.
Like railroads, utilities had their beginnings in some new and exciting high-tech industries. Water supply was
already taken for granted in cities at the beginning of our sample: in fact, supply of running water to homes dates
back thousands of years to ancient Rome. But supply of natural gas and then of electricity must have seemed truly
revolutionary.
Natural gas was indeed exciting. An observer in 1878 wrote:
“Gas is rather too unsubstantial a material, it might seem, to create excitement among sober business
men ... But, invisible and unsubstantial as this class of chemical agents is, at the present moment nothing
in nature or art is more talked about the world over ... As regards the use of gas for fuel, this is a matter
which excites the interest of every housekeeper in Christendom. If, the good ladies say, we can only be
rid of the nuisance of coal fires, with the attendant ashes, dust, dirt, and labor, we shall regard it as the
dawn of the housekeeper’s millennium.”41
As if that excitement weren’t enough, it was that same year, 1878, that Thomas Edison founded the Edison Electric
Light Company. It was in 1882 that Edison actually began supplying some electricity, and electric light, to homes
in New York and London. The process of electrification involved substantial innovation and capital investment, a
process that was largely completed, even in rural areas, by the 1920s.
Over time, new inventions would create new flurries of excitement in the Utilities sector. For example, the
invention of vaccum tube amplification of telephone signals in the teens brought the telephone to most households by
the 1920s: by then the average American made over 200 phone calls a year. These must have seemed like life-changing
events, and exciting to investors. It is no surprise that the Utilities index showed the greatest strength in the years
leading up to the 1929 stock market crash. Barron’s wrote in July 1929, months before the crash:
“The unbridled speculation in public utilities has now reached the point where it is incapable of
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scramble, is taking place. The hysterical psychology now prevalent resembles that which attended the
boom for steel stocks at the formation of the United States Steel Corp. in the early days of this century.
For the long pull, investors will probably do better to make their commitments when the smoke has cleared
way and the big units shake down into their niches.”42
With the 1929 stock market crash, the Utilities sector suffered a sharp decline. Figure 3 shows inflation-adjusted total
return indices for the three sectors as well as for the overall stock market on, again, a logarithmic scale. Between the
third quarter of 1929 and the second quarter of 1932, Utilities lost more than 75% of its real total return value, with
the decline only being slightly smaller at approximately 55% when looking at a ten-year horizon after the peak in the
third quarter of 1929. The Utilities sector had some of the most glamorous and life-changing innovations before 1929,
but by the middle third of the twentieth century it too, like Railroads, became a stable, and relatively boring, sector.
The overall trend in the real total return performance of both of these sectors is fairly similar during the second
half of the twentieth century, with divergences only re-emerging towards the turn of the century, when Railroads
clearly outperformed Utilities. Looking at the overall performance of Utilities over the entire sample period, the
importance of the total return consideration to reinvest dividends becomes apparent once again. Whereas Utilities
actually declined in real terms according to their price level, the more accurate picture provided by the real total
return index shows an almost 2,028-fold increase over the full time span.
As impressive as the performance of the real total return series for Utilities is, the performance of the real total
return series Industrials sector is even more so, as it increases slightly more than 19,600-fold over the entire period
of almost a century and a half. The Industrials sector, as we have noted, is rather more a catchall sector, whose
glamour and excitement consists of sparkles here and there, and not something that we can describe well in general
terms. In the first half of the twentieth century, there was excitement about radio, which started, by the 1920s, to
link all households together in networks of entertainment and news. Around the same time, automobiles became a
mass market industry, and this was exciting too, for it freed people from public transportation, so that they could
go wherever they wanted, whenever they wanted, and it changed the layout of the nation, made possible the full
development of the suburbs as well as the urbanization of the land. But then, the excitement about the automobile in
the U.S. was tempered by the advent of much foreign competition. Airlines eventually conspired with the automobile
to further displace the railroad. In smaller details, the motion picture became a pastime of millions, countless
consumer goods in disposable packages changed the everyday elements of our lives. Computers and mobile phones,
and all the other trappings of the information revolution were later comers to the Industrials sector. All of these
separate stories came at different times and with different psychological connotations to give a sense of excitement to
the Industrials sector.
3.4 Pricing of the Sectors
The value proposition suggests that market prices for the three sectors reflect a combination of genuine information
about the future and public misinformation and emotion. The efficient markets hypothesis is by this view best
regarded as a half-truth, something always to keep in mind, but never to believe fully. A speculative bubble is a
self-fulfilling feedback loop of price increases to further increases, analogous to an epidemic. The initial price increases
attract attention to theories that justify the bubble, and bring more people in who wish to buy, causing prices to
increase, and these price increases further generate talk and excitement. They are social epidemics, with new era
stories spreading as if they were viruses. Eventually, the epidemic must come to an end, for there are no more new
people to infect, and the bubble bursts. But, bubbles do not need to be of this extreme variety, just as a disease
epidemic does not have to affect all of society, but can be limited to a susceptible subgroup.
The classic stories of the most salient bubbles (the tulipmania, the roaring twenties, etc.) describe them as a
preoccupation of all of society, and focal point of attention. But mispricings smaller than bubbles do not necessarily
represent a preoccupation and need not be society-wide. Mispricings can pass unnoticed by most people, in contrast
to bubbles that make the headlines and may be remembered in popular culture for centuries. Such mispricings can
42See The Trader (1929).
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Figure 3: These two charts show a total return index for the overall stock market (top graph) and for the sectors
Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads (bottom graph). The total return indices are quarterly starting at the end of
the fourth quarter 1872 and ending at the end of the fourth quarter in 2012. The nominal price data is identical to
the data displayed in Figure 1. Dividend information from 1873 until 1934 is extracted from series P and series C in
Cowles (1939) on a monthly basis, as outlined in Appendix A, and subsequently aggregated into quarterly information.
After 1935, dividend information is from the Security Price Index Record, complemented by information from the
Analysts’ Handbook for Railroads after 1982 and for Industrials, Utilities, and the overall stock market starting in
the fourth quarter of 2001. The dividend information after 1935 is initially quoted as 12-month trailing sums, which
we turn into quarterly information using quarterly actuals from the 1990s. In consequence, we obtain dividend series
of actual quarterly numbers for the overall stock as well as for the three sectors. We construct nominal total return
series by assuming that dividends are reinvested at the end of the quarter, in which they occur. Subsequently, we
adjust the indices for inflation, applying the same procedure as outlined in the description of Figure 1. Finally, we
remain true to the convention to display all time series on a logarithmic scale (natural logarithm).
4 THE CYCLICALLY ADJUSTED PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO AND INDIVIDUAL SECTORS 15
in principle not even have spectacular price increases, perhaps only outperformance relative to another sector, if that
outperformance is seen as justifying and supporting some viral story that suggests the success of that sector.
The mispricings can reflect, to some degree, simple misperceptions, such as the common misperception today that
the Railroads sector has something to do with passenger service. Today in the U.S., freight revenues for railroads are
roughly thirty times passenger revenues, and all of the intercity passenger revenues go to the government anyway.43
Yet many people are left with the faulty impression that decline in public interest in passenger rail service is a risk for
publicly-traded railroads today. That misperception does not drive everyone, but plausibly enough people to make a
difference that will be noticeable in returns.
Figure 3 shows that the Railroads sector has underperformed the stocks reflected in the Industrials sector quite
substantially over the full sample period. This has been noted before, e.g. by Keeler (1983), though never studied
over such a long time interval as we show. However, it can also be seen, from the relative slopes, that there were
decades-long intervals when the Railroads sector outperformed other sectors, including some recent decades. The
same has been true for the Utilities vis-a-vis either the Industrials and the Railroads sector, too. Thus, there are
opportunities for investors in switching between sectors over time.
Despite the outlined differences between the sectors in Figure 3, it is interesting to observe that the overall growth
patterns of the real total return series of the three sectors are overall rather similar. How can this similarity arise, when
the industries reflected by the three sectors were so different from each other? Wouldn’t one think that random shocks
to the three industries would have produced much different returns over a century? In particular, do some industries
not grow obsolete and others undergo rebirths? The similarity of long-term trend across the sectors highlight the
importance of distinguishing between the industry and the existing firms within an industry, which comprise our
index at any point of time, and to distinguish between return and earnings growth. There is a common fallacy of
thinking that investing in a sector total return index is much the same as owning a share of all the earnings of a
sector. In fact, there is a fundamental difference, partly because the reinvestment of dividends causes the investment
to tend to grow faster than the sector, and because of the issuance (or repurchase) of new shares, either by existing
companies or by new companies that spring up. Over long intervals of time the difference is substantial.
The fallacy of neglecting what share issuance there will be is as old as the stock market. In fact, this fallacy is
fundamentally tied up with mispricings, as the popular intellectual magazine The Spectator wrote in the 1845, just
before the peak of the railroad bubble in the U.K:
“Such an universal hallucination was perhaps never witnessed. There is indeed one fact which accounts
for it, though it does not disarm the prospect of its danger; of a large proportion of the schemes it may
be said that anyone would be not only justifiable but commendable; the difficulty is not in the inherent
badness of all the projects, but in their aggregate enormity; yet as each set of speculators is justified in its
own enterprise, it is hard to make it morally responsible for all the rest. Individually, each speculator—we
are alluding now to the bona fide and desirable projects—is right; collectively they are all wrong.”44
4 The Cyclically Adjusted Price-Earnings Ratio and Individual Sectors
4.1 The Construction of the Cyclically Adjusted Price-Earnings Ratio
The fallacy that the quote from The Spectator refers to in the previous section might easily have been spotted by
looking at the aggregate value of all railroad stocks, including those that had not yet any earnings, and comparing
that with the existing earnings on those stocks. Fortunately, with our price and earnings data, we do not need to
collect special new data for this: We can do this systematically at all times for all sectors by looking at the Cyclically
Adjusted Price-Earnings (CAPE) ratio. The general rule for this ratio, in line with, for example, the price-earnings
ratio, is that low values of the ratio provide a signal of undervaluation, and hence a potentially attractive investment
opportunity, whereas high values signal overvaluation, which will supposedly be corrected in the future.
43See the description of the of the role of Amtrak for the Railroads sector in the beginning of section 3.
44See Littell and Littell (1846) for a reprinted version of the article from The Spectator.
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Improving on earlier inspiration from Graham and Dodd (1934),45 Campbell and Shiller (1988) use the term
“cyclically adjusted” to refer to the fact that a ten-year average of earnings is used for the ratio, which is spread over
an interval of time much longer than the typical business cycle, and hence is not much affected by such. However, the
consideration of data over such an extended period of time necessitates two kinds of corrections. The second correction
eliminates the impact of inflation during the ten years by using real numbers for the numerator and denominator
of the ratio, a procedure that has already been applied in Campbell and Shiller (1988), when first constructing the
original CAPE ratio that forms the basis for the ratio that we will be considering.46 The first correction acknowledges
that CAPE has an innate dependency on corporate payout policy, coming from its long-term view that it takes on
earnings. For illustration purposes, let us revert to the individual-company level and consider a very much simplified
environment with two identical companies that have not exhausted their growth opportunities. The only difference is
that company A does not distribute any earnings to its shareholders, whereas company B pays a substantial fraction,
say 50%, of its earnings as dividends. If both companies are exactly identical now (in particular their investment
opportunity set coincides), the earnings per share for the two companies will gradually diverge with company B’s
EPS underperforming those of company A. Additionally, company B’s price per share will be lower by the nature of
the differing payout policy in future years. However, the crucial aspect is that the future ten-year average of earnings
per share will not change as much as the price per share across the two companies, which means that company B’s
CAPE will be lower than that of company A.
The outlined issue does not only pertain to comparisons across companies (or sectors), but also to comparisons
along the time series of a company (or sector). We do not consider it appropriate that a period of increased payout
to shareholders should be associated with the CAPE ratio for this company (or sector) providing a signal of a more
attractive investment opportunity by virtue of a lower value.
In order to counteract this dependency of CAPE on corporate payout policy, we revert to total return numbers for
the computation of CAPE. For the numerator of CAPE, the current price, this amounts to the inclusion of dividends
to construct a new time series. The question arises of how to adapt the denominator of CAPE. It is out of question
to leave the denominator of CAPE unchanged, as one would divide an increasingly higher number total return price
number by a ten-year average of earnings that remains on the same scale, which would lead to the deterioration of
the levels of CAPE over time. Therefore, we scale the 12-month trailing earnings per share numbers by the ratio of
the total return price to the price return price, i.e.










Another way to think about this change of the 12-month trailing sum of earnings is that it preserves the P/E-ratio
of a sector after the price changes from price return numbers to total return numbers.
After having adjusted these scaled earnings for inflation, two more issues need to be addressed until we can
compute the denominator of the CAPE ratio. The first issue relates to earnings announcements of companies. In
order to access real-time valuation signals from the CAPE ratio, it is crucial to ensure that all information is known
at the time that we report a CAPE ratio in a given month. Whereas this complication does not arise for prices, as
these are known on the spot, it certainly affects the denominator of the CAPE ratio, which builds on earnings. As
companies report earnings for a given period with a lag, we have to make sure that all earnings information used for
the computation of the denominator of the CAPE ratio has already been reported at the time, for which we report
the CAPE ratio. Generally, we therefore aim to impose a six-month lag on earnings, which is however complicated by
the second issue to be addressed, the fact that our earnings observations change frequency from annual observations
before 1935 to quarterly observations thereafter. For the details of our solution to this pair of issues, please refer to
Appendix B.
We compute the CAPE ratio for the overall stock market as well as for the three sectors Industrials, Utilities, and
45See the quote from Benjamin Graham’s and David Dodd’s textbook Security Analysis, referred to in footnote 3.
46The original article, Campbell and Shiller (1988), computes the CAPE ratio as the logarithm of the real price divided by the ten-year
average of the logarithm of earnings, i.e. a geometric average of earnings. Our specification does not take this formulation as its starting
point, but formulations as they have been employed later in Campbell and Shiller (1998), Campbell and Shiller (2001), and Shiller (2005).
The latter formulations have taken hold in the public discourse about CAPE.
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Figure 4: This figure shows the CAPE ratio for the overall stock market (All Stocks), Industrials, Utilities, and
Railroads. The quarterly time series start with the fourth quarter of 1882 and end with the second quarter of 2012.
As outlined in Section 4, we construct CAPE as the ratio of real total return price (see Figure 3) and a ten-year
average of ten observations of scaled, 12-month trailing real earnings numbers (see Figure 2 for the unscaled analogue
of these earnings series). The scaling (further explained in Section 4) occurs at the level of nominal numbers, which
are subequently inflation-adjusted. When constructing ten-year averages, minor adaptations are necessary to account
for the transition from annual earnings to quarterly earnings in 1935, which we describe in detail in Appendix B. In
general, we lag all earnings observations after 1936 that enter the long-term averages of earnings by two quarters, in
order to guarantee that all earnings that enter a CAPE ratio in the end of a specific quarter are known at that time.
Before 1936, where we only have annual earnings observations, we use earnings numbers for the previous year for
each quarter of a given year except for the first and earnings numbers from the year before that in the first quarter,
effectively establishing a lag ranging between six months (second quarter) and fifteen months (first quarter).
Railroads at the end of each quarter starting with the fourth quarter of 188247 and ending with the fourth quarter of
2012. For example, to compute the CAPE ratio at the end of the first quarter of 1995, we use the real total return
series48 at the end of the first quarter of 1995. For the denominator, we use the real earnings series at the end of the
third quarter of 1994,49 the end of the third quarter of 1993, and so on, until the end of the third quarter of 1985.
Each of these real earnings numbers will be scaled by the contemporaneous price series to adjust for the usage of the
total return series in the numerator. For example, the observation at the end of the third quarter of 1993 will be
adjusted using the total return series at the end of the third quarter of 1993 together with the price index at the end
of the third quarter of 1993. As the final step in the computation of the CAPE ratio, we form the arithmetic average
of the ten scaled, real earnings observations and divide the total return price at the end of the first quarter of 1995
by this average.
We plot the CAPE ratio for the overall market as well as for the three sectors Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads
in Figure 4. Note that the CAPE ratio of the three sectors shows a relatively similar pattern across sectors through
time, but there are significant differences. Notably, in the 1929 peak, the Utilities sector stood out, because of a sharp
47At the starting point for the CAPE ratio, we have to ensure that we have a sufficient length of earnings history. We therefore cannot
start the series for the CAPE ratio until ten years into our full sample.
48As previously outlined, the inflation adjustment for this observation builds upon the level of the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) in
December 1994.
49This number will have been inflation-adjusted by the CPI-U in June 1994. We will not explicitly reference the observations from the
CPI-U series for the remaining earnings observations in this example, but these follow the same principle.
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increase in the numerator of the ratio, and Utilities’ CAPE ratio set the all-time high record in the third quarter
of that year with slightly more than 60. In that same quarter, the CAPE ratio for the Industrials sector was high,
but much less so, only slightly more than 36. In comparison, the Railroads sector’s CAPE ratio at that time was
around 20. The other dramatic peak, in the fourth quarter of 1999, was dominated not by the Utilities sector but
by Industrials, when the Industrials sector’s CAPE ratio reached nearly 58 then. In comparison, the CAPE ratio for
Railroads at that time varied between somewhat more than 30 and approximately 15 and the ratio for Utilities barely
exceeded 30 at its peak. The all-time record low in our sample was set by Railroads, in the second quarter of 1932,
with the CAPE ratio dropping below 2.5. During that time, Industrials’s CAPE ratio was also low at close to 6 and
Utilities’ CAPE ratio came close to 10. We venture that these broad swings in entire sectors of our economy are not
entirely due to changes in rational expectations for the future dividends and earnings, and must mean something for
subsequent returns.
The CAPE ratio can clearly be categorized as a value measure, in particular as a measure that captures long-
term valuation because of its consideration of ten years of earnings data. Its value-focus situates it in the academic
tradition originating from Basu (1977), Fama and French (1992), Lakonishok et al. (1994), and Chan et al. (1995),
who have investigated value-based investing in the United States, or Chan et al. (1991), who focus on Japan. The
most common value measures are however the price-earnings ratio, which neglects the benefits of ten-year averaging
of the earnings information alluded to above, and the book-to-market ratio, which interacts balance sheet information
and market information and is therefore a different kind of value-variable. Moreover, the literature on value-investing
classically looks at value measures on an individual-firm-level, which are then used to sort individual stocks into a
value-based portfolio, most commonly in a long-short consideration. We however look at the CAPE ratio as our
valuation measure on the aggregate level of a sector already, building on aggregated price- and earnings-information
to assess the over-and undervaluation of an entire sector of the US economy, and not of an individual company.
For more recent overviews of the literature on value-investing, see Chan and Lakonishok (2004) as well as Fama
(1998) or Campbell (2000), where the latter two surveys focus on theoretical explanations that have been put forward
as rationales for the existence of value premia. Most recently, Asness et al. (2012) and Fama and French (2012) have
extended the evidence in favor of the effectiveness of value-based investing to a broad international level and have
also underscored the existence of value premia in asset classes other than equity.
4.2 The CAPE Ratio, a Railroads Example, and Return Predictability
Looking back at the railroads bubble in the middle of the 19th century, one could speculate about the CAPE ratio
for the Railroads sector during that time. While we do not have CAPE data for 1845, the peak of the railroad bubble
in the U.K., and while the reliability of the CAPE ratio as an indicator may not be high in the beginning years of
a new industry, we can be pretty sure that the ratio of aggregate price to aggregate earnings for all railroads would
have been very high then, and CAPE would have served as a warning away from that bubble. Less dramatically,
CAPE might have warned us of smaller mispricings in the Railroads sector, or in other sectors, that are generated
by investor emotions or prejudices that are a lot weaker than those seen in bubble times, and harder to judge except
by reference to some indicator like CAPE.
According to the historian Andrew Odlyzko, arguments like that in The Spectator were made repeatedly by
doubters during the U.K. railroad boom of the mid-1840s, but their effect on thinking about the bubble was diminished
by another popular argument of that time: that the railroads, initiated in the 1830s in another boom, had appeared to
fail at first but were ultimately successful, that, similarly, all the railroads being built in the 1840s should eventually
be successful as the economy and demand grew.50
That argument must continually have been on the minds of people thinking about railroads well into the twentieth
century, until competing modes of transportation began to be seen as ending the seeming inevitability of railroads.
The memory of the railroad bubble of the 1840s, embellished in many newspaper stories, must have stuck in many
people’s minds, too, however less clearly as the decades wore on as memories faded. There was a tug of war between
two seemingly plausible stories, the story of railroad inevitability in a growing economy and the story of bubbles,
50See Odlyzko (2010).
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and no fully objective way to declare a winner. Ultimately, the outcome of such a tug of war is never clear, it results
merely in an array of different opinions about whether today’s price is good or not. Moreover, there is no simple way
to convey this opinion to the multitude, for price changes every day, and so opinions on railroads as investments may
change faster than the knowledge of them can disseminate across investors.
The evaluation of the stories we tell about stocks requires considerably more subtle thinking, and cannot be
achieved definitively, since the distant future is always diffuse in our minds. Because of such subtlety, we may
ultimately find ourselves relying on such an imperfect indicator as the CAPE ratio in judging a bubble, or in judging
more modest mispricing. Such an indicator, however imperfect, may loom large in intelligent thinking about the
mispricing, because it allows comparisons with other times and other sectors, and there is no more precise way to do
quantitative work to inform our judgments.
We will provide evidence for the predictive ability of the CAPE ratio in two ways. At first, we look at each sector
in isolation and for the sake of completeness also at the overall stock market (represented by the S&P Composite
Index). Our goal in this context is to analyze whether the level of CAPE contains any information about future long-
term returns accrued within a specific sector. In the next section, we will extend this analysis to include predictions
about differential performance across sectors, outlining how to use the CAPE ratio to assess differences in future
returns between different sectors.
However, we would first like to address the question whether the CAPE ratio of a sector contains any information
about the very same sector’s subsequent return performance. The left panels of Figures 5 through 8 show scatter
diagrams for the S&P Composite Index as well as for each of the three sectors.51 On the x-axis, we display the
CAPE ratio of a sector, incorporating the transition to real numbers and to total return numbers. It is measured at
the end of each quarter starting in the third quarter of 1902 until the fourth quarter of 2002.52 The y-axis captures
subsequent ten-year returns, as measured from the beginning of the quarter immediately following the end of the
quarter, for which the corresponding CAPE ratio of the sector has been computed, to the beginning of the quarter
that begins ten years later. That is, the first observation is a ten-year return from the beginning of the fourth quarter
of 1902 until the beginning of the fourth quarter of 1912 and the last observation is the ten-year return between the
beginning of the first quarter of 2003 until the beginning of the first quarter of 2013. As the time intervals for the
data used for the computation of the CAPE ratio and the data for the computation of the corresponding long-term
return are truly disjoint, we obtain a genuine and clean assessment of the performance that an investor can expect
ten years into the future when knowing the level of CAPE at the end of a given quarter. Finally, we have labeled
each point in the scatters by the time, at which CAPE is computed. Each entry contains the year followed by the
number of the quarter.
Figure 5 is for the S&P Composite Index. Four caveats are necessary to point out with regard to the figure and
subsequent correlation scatters. First, it is important to keep in mind that the y-axis depicts returns over a ten-year
horizon. Therefore, any individual long-term return observation is necessarily fairly similar to a subsequent long-term
observation, which is measured one quarter later, as successive long-term return observations have an overlap of 39
quarters. This autocorrelation pattern will prevent long-term returns to make sudden shifts. Second and somewhat
relatedly, we cannot rule out the existence of a small-sample problem, even though the scatter plots cover more 100
years of data.53 This is due to the long-term nature of returns depicted in the scatter diagram, which reduces the
number of truly independent long-term return observations to approximately ten. Finally, we acknowledge a potential
spurious association problem, as we assess the long-term change in prices relative to a ratio, which uses the same
price variable in its numerator. This problem should not be mistaken for a predictability problem, which we have
addressed by carefully constructing the CAPE ratio from observations that have occurred before the time period over
which returns are measured. Nevertheless, spuriousness might lead to some degree of negative association between the
CAPE ratio and subsequent returns. Moreover, the randomness of the CAPE ratio introduces a second spuriousness
51We will address the information contained in the right panels of Figures 5 through 8 in the subsequent section, but it will turn out
to be interesting to compare these panels side-by-side.
52Although our sample allows us to compute the first CAPE ratio at the end of the fourth quarter of 1882, we limit the time series for
the CAPE ratio to 1902. This is to ensure comparability with the cross-sectional predictability analysis based on the CAPE ratio, which
we will outline in the next section.
53See, for example, Stambaugh (1999) for the impact of small-sample effects on the analysis of predictability.
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channel into the correlation of the CAPE ratio and subsequent long-term returns through the randomness of the
CAPE ratio in conjunction with de-facto smallness of the sample.
In order to address these caveats, we perform a simulation study for each of the correlation scatters involving the
CAPE ratio and long-term returns, whose procedure closely matches the kind of simulation study that Campbell and
Shiller (1998, 2001) perform. We hereby create simulated data for the CAPE-ratio by estimating an AR(1)-process for
the natural logarithm of the underlying data for the CAPE-ratio.54We hereby correct the autoregressive coefficient
of the logarithmic CAPE-ratio using the formula in Orcutt and Winokur Jr. (1969), which corrects for a bias as
analyzed in Kendall (1954) and Marriott and Pope (1954).55 Moreover, we simulate quarterly returns as random
walks in the natural logarithm of the underlying inflation-adjusted total-return index.56 Imposing the assumption
of a random walk for the price process makes returns inherently unpredictable, which is a core assumption of our
simulation exercise. Ultimately, we are interested in rejecting the notion that the association between our valuation
ratio and subsequent long-term returns can arise from purely unpredictable returns.
The simulated normally distributed error-terms in both the AR(1)-equation for the CAPE-ratio as well as in the
random walk evolution for the real, total-return index match the mean and the standard deviation of their empirical
counterparts. Additionally, we set up their joint distribution’s covariance to match that of the empirical counterpart.
When calculating the empirical quantities, we rely on samples for the CAPE ratio as well as for the total-return
index starting in the third quarter of 1902, which is the same timeframe displayed from Figures 5 onwards.57 Finally,
for both the evolution of the simulated CAPE ratio as well as the simulated total return indices, we use the actual
starting value of each of the underlying series.
Running 100, 000 iterations of the simulation exercise, we obtain a distribution of the correlation between the
CAPE ratio and subsequent long-term returns. This will then allow us to determine a p-value corresponding to
the actual correlation value as the probability mass that falls below the actual correlation value. This is what we
will henceforth refer to as the simulation-based p-value. It captures the probability that the observed correlation is
compatible with the notion that we aim to reject of unpredictable returns for the overall market or for the respective
sector of the overall market, respectively.58
We perform the simulation exercise independently for the overall stock market as well as for the three sectors
Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads, as long as we consider the predictive ability of the CAPE ratio for the overall
market as well as for the three sectors independently from each other. This will be different, once the CAPE ratio
will play a role in allocations across sectors in the later analyis, which we will then elaborate on in greater detail.
Figure 5 shows a clearly negative association between both CAPE and subsequent long-term returns. That is,
historically, low values of CAPE, indicating undervaluation, are followed by higher long-term returns and, vice versa,
high values of CAPE and Relative CAPE indicating overvaluation correlate with lower subsequent ten-year returns.59
54Taking the natural logarithm of the underlying CAPE-series allows us to better control for the skewness in the empirical distribution
of the ratio, making the assumption of normally distributed error terms that is then incorporated in the simulation more reasonable.
55See MacKinnon and Smith Jr. (1998) for an exposition of this kind of bias correction for autoregressive estimation.
56The argument in favor of the natural logarithm rests again on the skewness of the empirical distibution of the percentage changes in
the underlying real, total-return index.
57When we later investigate correlation structures for shorter timeframes, we preserve the original horizon for the estimation of the
empirical quantities and simply shorten the time series of the simulated processes to reflect the shorter time horizon.
58As pointed out, the simulation procedure outlined above closely resembles the approach pursued in Campbell and Shiller (1998,
2001), which is related to the procedure in Goetzmann and Jorion (1993); Nelson and Kim (1993) or in Campbell and Shiller (1989).
The simulations in Campbell and Shiller (1998, 2001) aim at understanding the predictive ability of the dividend-price ratio, and not
of the CAPE ratio, which is - on the overall market level - also analyzed in Campbell and Shiller (1998, 2001), but not the subject of
the simulation analysis of the statistical validity of the predictive evidence provided by the scatter diagrams of the valuation ratio and
subsequent long-term returns.Nelson and Kim (1993) further the robustness of the predictive ability of the dividend-price ratio in the
presence of small-sample concerns, mostly relying on an AR(1)-structure. Relatedly, Goetzmann and Jorion (1993) concern themselves
with the predictive ability of the dividend yield, but rely on simulations of the return process to infer the dividend yield from the actual,
historic dividend-price ratio. Campbell and Shiller (1989) explicitly include a close variant of the CAPE ratio (with a thirty-year horizon
for earnings) in their simulation exercise, but only to develop a better understanding of their VAR parameter restrictions implied by
linearized present value models connecting dividends and returns.
59Displaying the scatter diagrams of long-term returns and a valuation ratio such as the CAPE ratio naturally touches on the more
general academic discussion of the validity of predictive regressions, see for example Welch and Goyal (2008) and Campbell and Thompson
(2008). Welch and Goyal (2008), investigating a multitude of predictive variables, raise doubts about the out-of-sample performance of
this kind of regression in general. In contrast, Campbell and Thompson (2008) introduce sensible and fairly non-restrictive restrictions
on predictive regressions (related to the sign of the prediction variables and/or to the sign of the implied equity premium) and strongly
argue in favor of the validity of predictive regressions. Interestingly, the version of the CAPE ratio that they use proves to be one of the
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The correlation between CAPE and long-term return is almost −57% with a simulation-based p-value of 0.0213. This
evidence is consistent with the results presented in Campbell and Shiller (1998, 2001) and extends their results by
roundabout another decade, even in the presence of the modifications that we have undertaken to the version of the
CAPE ratio in these analyses. The statistical simulation furthermore underscores that the degree to which this result
arises from statistical spuriousness is very small at best.
Figure 6 displays the information contained in Figure 5 in a summarized and more pronounced manner.60 It
starts from the same pairs of observations for the CAPE ratio and the subsequent, annualized real total ten-year
return that Figure 5 shows. It however then treats the complete time series (from the third quarter of 1902 until
the fourth quarter of 2002) of CAPE ratios as an empirical distribution and splits the CAPE observations in tertiles.
The bars represent averages of the corresponding ten-year returns for all the observations of the CAPE ratio that
fall into a specific tertile. On a technical note, by “average” we refer to the geometric mean of the non-annualized
real total ten-year returns, which is subsequently annualized. The notion that the CAPE ratio negatively predicts
future returns should be reflected in the tertile bars in the form of decreasing bars from the first to the third tertile.
This is clearly the case in the left panel of Figure 6, which displays a clear monotonicity from the first to the third
tertile. The smallest observations of the CAPE ratio are associated with an average annualized total real return of
approximately 10%, which exceeds the average for the second tertile by more than 4% annually and the average of
the thrd tertile by nearly 7% annually.
The evidence in the scatter diagrams for the Industrials and the Utilities sector, shown in the left panel of Figures 7
and 9 respectively, is nearly identical to that for the overall stock market. One observes a strongly negative correlation
of approximately −54% for Industrials with an associated simulation-based p-value of 0.0378 and an even slightly
stronger effect for Utilities with a correlation of −63%, which translates into a simulation-based p-value of 0.0072.
With regard to the averaged representation of long-term real total returns for tertiles of the distribution of
the CAPE ratio, the evidence for Industrials and Utilities is also coherent when compared to the graph for the
overall stock market. Both charts show a monotonous decline of the average long-term returns with the first decile’s
return exceeding the third decile’s by approximately 5.5% for Industrials and 8% for Utilities. The only qualitative
difference is the behavior of the average return for the middle tertile, which resembles the first tertile’s much more
for the Industrials sector than it does for the Utilities sector.
Finally, the evidence for the Railroads sector in Figure 11 is consistent with the evidence from the other two
sectors and also from the overall stock market. This sector provides the comparably weakest overall evidence in
favor of the predictive ability of CAPE for subsequent long-term returns, with a correlation of nearly −35% that is
associated with quite a high simulation-based p-value of 0.2283. As can be seen from the time labels of the scatter
plots, the main impact for the weaker evidence of the scatter plot comes from the 1990s, which was a period with
a comparatively high level of CAPE. At the same time, the long-term returns reaching into the beginning of the
twentieth century have been quite substantial, in contrast to the overvaluation signal given by CAPE.
The tertile-based evidence for the Railroads sector underlines the predictive ability of the CAPE ratio for subse-
quent returns, showing a solid degree of monotonicity in average returns. The degree, to which the average for the
first tertile exceeds that of the third tertile, is even the strongest among all three sectors with more than 8%.
In conjunction, these correlations and the accompanying bar chart representations are new confirmation of our
theory, never before tested on sector data and never investigated for such a long time period. However, the CAPE
ratio is not a spotless predictor of returns, far from it: Its annual return predictions (instead of the ten-year predictions
shown in Figures 5 through 12) exhibit weaker correlation. Correlations for this shorter time period are slightly higher
−24% for the overall stock market, slightly stronger than −24% for Industrials, close to −20% for Utilities, and
approximately −23% for Railroads. We will refrain from specifying the corresponding simulation-based significance
results at this point and refer instead to section 6, in which we analyze the sensitivity of our correlation analysis more
generally. There, we will not only investigate variations in the horizon over which we calculate subsequent returns,
but also in the time horizon used to smooth earnings in the denominator of the CAPE ratio. We will thereby vary
strongest predictive variables (see tables 1 and 2 in Campbell and Thompson (2008)).
60We will again focus on the left panel initially and revert back to the information contained in the right panel, once we have formally
introduced the concept of the Relative CAPE indicator.
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Figure 5: The left panel depicts a scatter diagram of the CAPE ratio (discussed in Section 4) of the overall stock
market and the right panel depicts the analogous scatter using Relative CAPE (discussed in Section 5). On the x-axis
of the left panel, we display the CAPE ratio of the overall market, incorporating the transition to real numbers and to
total return numbers. It is measured at the end of each quarter starting in the third quarter of 1902 until the fourth
quarter of 2002. The x-axis of the right panel captures the Relative CAPE of the overall market, using the same
timing convention as for CAPE ratio. The y-axis, which is common to both panels, captures subsequent ten-year
total returns, as measured from the beginning of the quarter immediately following the end of the quarter, for which
the corresponding CAPE ratio or Relative CAPE indicator of the sector has been computed, to the beginning of the
quarter that begins ten years later. The first observation is a ten-year return from the beginning of the fourth quarter
of 1902 until the beginning of the fourth quarter of 1912 and the last observation is the ten-year return between the
beginning of the first quarter of 2003 until the beginning of the first quarter of 2013. We have labeled each point in
the scatters by the time, at which the CAPE ratio or the Relative CAPE indicator, respectively, is computed. Each
entry contains the year followed by the number of the quarter.
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Ten−Year Returns for Tertiles of Relative CAPE Distribution − All Stocks






























Figure 6: This figure displays the same information about the overall US stock market as Figure 5, but in a more
aggregate manner. In the left panel, we split the distribution of CAPE ratios for the overall stock market from the
third quarter of 1902 until the fourth quarter of 2002 into three tertiles. For each tertile, we geometrically average
the corresponding, subsequent, non-annualized ten-year return numbers and annualize the average. The right panel
is conceptually identical to the left panel, but uses the Relative CAPE indicator instead of the CAPE ratio.
the smoothing horizon to range from the horizon used for the classical P/E valuation ratio (1 year) until we have
reached the horizon underlying the CAPE ratio (10 years).
Reconsidering the evidence from Figure 11 for Railroads in a little bit more detail, it becomes apparent that the
Railroads sector’s scatter seems to have been the strongest among the three sectors in terms of tightness of fit of the
scatter in the earlier years, but then to have shifted substantially after the mid-1990s. Before the 1990s, the entire
scatter was shifted to the left relative to the scatters of the other two sectors. After the 1990s, the entire scatter
moved up to the right to rejoin the region of Industrials, as displayed in Figure 7. Fortunately, the CAPE ratio
rose even dramatically higher for Industrials around that time, and so a comparison across sectors based on the two
sectors CAPE ratio around 2000 would have given exactly the right advice: to move out of Industrials into Railroads
then. However, we do not wish to rely on that lucky example, and wish somehow to correct CAPE for its tendency
to go through long swings, as we saw with Railroads. A few further aspects are noteworthy from Figure 4, the plot
of the sectors’ CAPE ratio over time. Railroads had the lowest CAPE ratio for a half century, from the 1920s to
the 1970s. Utilities had the lowest CAPE ratio for most of the time since the late 1970s. But, equally apparent,
investing in the lowest CAPE stocks would not appear to have been advantageous, since, as we have seen in Figure
3, Industrials outperformed overall, while their CAPE was usually higher than the others.
5 CAPE-Based Comparisons Across Sectors
5.1 Varying Growth Prospects Across Sectors
The shift in the scatter of points that we see for Railroads is troublesome. It means that using CAPE to predict
returns, or to distinguish between projected returns, for sectors may be unreliable. The problem is that a sector,
as illustrated by Railroads, might show low CAPE for a long period of time because its CAPE is, at that time in
history, naturally lower. Let us consider why, in the example, average CAPE, and the entire scatter of points, might



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: This figure is the analogue of Figure 5 for the Industrials sector instead of the overall stock market.













Ten−Year Returns for Tertiles of CAPE Distribution − Industrials










































Ten−Year Returns for Tertiles of Relative CAPE Distribution − Industrials






























Figure 8: This figure is the conceptual analogue of Figure 6, summarizing the information from Figure 7 for the
Industrials sector.
have been lower for the period before the 1990s.
First we must ask, what, after all, are railroads, in terms of their engineering and economic significance? Railroads
are distinguished, of course, from other modes of transportation by their use of steel rails and steel wheels. That
represents a significant invention in terms of transport efficiency. Wrought iron rails were invented in 1820 and steel
rails in 1857, as part of a lively period of invention of better surfaces for transportation vehicles in the early nineteenth
century. There were other inventions to reduce friction of that time, including plank roads and canals. Ultimately,
steel rails won the competition for durable low friction, and remain in heavy use today. Railroad transport, with
unimpeded right of way, avoids energy loss from frequent starts and stops, and the close-spacing of railway cars,
closer than is safe to maintain with cars and trucks, lowers wind friction. Hence it is possible to economize on motive
energy, by a factor of as much 20 to 1 between railroads and trucks. Today, basic railroad freight rates are typically
less than three cents per ton mile.
Also, the development of techniques to create a smooth railroad, and signaling systems to prevent accidents allowed
greater speeds. But another invention came in soon after, that of the pneumatic tire, patented by Robert William
Johnson in 1846, but not produced commercially until 1889. Tired vehicles, while far less energy efficient, have the
advantage that they can be driven smoothly on ordinary roads, which are subsidized by governments, and are not
confined to a predefined rail path. Yet other inventions, those of the automobile, and the expressway, appeared by
some in the twentieth century eventually to make the railroad obsolete.
The basic technology of steel rails and steel wheels remains today very significant. And yet other inventions
have encroached on its aspect of uniqueness. This fact has apparently been a factor in the lower CAPE ratio that
the Railroads sector has exhibited in much of the twentieth century. The relatively less inspirational trend for the
Railroads sector became readily apparent relatively early in the twentieth century, though the trend was never entirely
clear. A 1931 Barron’s article noted that:
“There has come an increasingly prevalent belief that the railroad star is setting; that they are in
process of obsolescence; that they may go the way of the ox-cart. People have viewed with alarm the
increase in highway competition from automobiles, buses, and trucks; the growing threat of gasoline
and natural-gas pipelines, a newer development, and the possibility of inroads on traffic by airways and













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9: This figure is the analogue of Figure 5 for the Utilities sector instead of the overall stock market.













Ten−Year Returns for Tertiles of CAPE Distribution − Utilities










































Ten−Year Returns for Tertiles of Relative CAPE Distribution − Utilities






























Figure 10: This figure is the conceptual analogue of Figure 6, summarizing the information from Figure 9 for the
Utilities sector.
waterways.”61
The article argues that the end of railroads was by no means imminent, but that the effects of the newfound
competition had been that “the rate of increase of railroad traffic in the decade ended in 1929 has been much
retarded in comparison with previous decades. The upward curve flattened out.”62
The article interpreted the lower price-earnings ratio for railroad stocks, when compared with other stocks at the
time, as reflecting this expected weakened future trajectory, or, at least as reflecting the risk of a lower trajectory.
Indeed, Figure 3 shows that the Railroads sector has been on a lower trajectory for nearly the next half-century
after this Barron’s article was written, so some degree of lower expectations for railroads would have been in an
approximate sense ex-post rational. This rational expectation might then account for lower CAPE, and for a scatter
of points like the one in the left panel of Figure 11 that is shifted down.
As can be seen from Figure 4, the CAPE ratio for the Railroads sector was pronouncedly lower than that for the
Utilities and the Industrials sector from the mid-1920s to the mid-1970s. Given the arguments presented in the above
Barron’s article, would it make sense to preferentially invest in the Railroads over the Utilities and the Industrials
sector on the basis of CAPE over that whole period? Perhaps we can credit the markets with enough efficiency to
take proper account of such obvious long-term trends or risks like the effects of the growth of automobile.
5.2 The Construction of the Relative CAPE Indicator
When the CAPE ratio makes somewhat shorter-term swings, it would appear to be more logical to attribute many
of these movements to public overreaction to news, and more likely to expect to see these movements later reversed.
We do not take the view that there is a single scale of values for the level of the CAPE ratio, on which all sectors
can be compared meaningfully. In contrast, we attribute to each sector its own scale of values of CAPE, from which
over- and undervaluation of this particular sector relative to its own long-term history is derived. When we make
comparisons across sectors, we therefore construct a standardization of the CAPE ratio, referred to as the Relative
61See Hovey (1931).
62See Hovey (1931).


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 11: This figure is the analogue of Figure 5 for the Railroads sector instead of the overall stock market.













Ten−Year Returns for Tertiles of CAPE Distribution − Railroads










































Ten−Year Returns for Tertiles of Relative CAPE Distribution − Railroads






























Figure 12: This figure is the conceptual analogue of Figure 6, summarizing the information from Figure 11 for the
Railroads sector.
CAPE indicator, by dividing the current period’s CAPE by its own twenty-year average,63 which has previously been
winsorized at the five-percent level.64
The division by the twenty-year average of CAPE removes both long-term trends and intermediate-term cycles,
leaving only the relatively higher frequency movements in CAPE. In terms of its valuation signal, it controls for the
issue of sectors having different growth trajectories, like the Railroads sector between the 1920s and the 1970s. At the
same time, it also erases other kinds of idiosyncracies of sectors that might affect the level of the non-standardized
CAPE ratio, like, for example, different accounting standards across sectors, which might affect a sector’s earnings
reports. Figure 13 shows the Relative CAPE indicator for the overall market as well as for the three sectors.
The question arises how closely the Relative CAPE indicator matches the behavior of the original CAPE ratio
and how much of the return predictability evidence outlined in Section 4 persists after transitioning from the CAPE
ratio to the Relative CAPE indicator. We do not expect the CAPE ratio and the Relative CAPE indicator to be
perfectly correlated, as the Relative CAPE indicator corrects for some deficiencies of the CAPE ratio with regard
to across-sector comparisons. On the other hand, it would be comforting not to see the Relative CAPE indicator
overturn all the information by the CAPE ratio. It turns out that the correlation between the two is about 85% for
the overall stock market, approximately 79% for the Industrials sector, almost 90% for the Utilities sector, and about
two thirds for the Railroads sector, the sector that we have found to require the biggest correction in terms of the
information provided by the plain CAPE ratio.
The right hand side panels of Figures 5 through 12 replace the CAPE ratio with the Relative CAPE indicator
in the predictive analysis for long-term returns for the overall market as well as for the three sectors. Overall, the
patterns across the two panels for each of the four figures is similar. The correlations for the overall market equals
approximately −39%, which is approximately a 17% drop when compared to the evidence for the CAPE ratio. We
apply the same simulation ( 100, 000 repititions) as in section 4 in order to assess the significance of the correlation
result against a simulated distribution derived under the assumption of no return predictability, whereby we perform
the outlined calculation of the Relative CAPE indicator for each simulation of the time series of the CAPE ratio. The
63The twenty-year average contains the current quarter’s CAPE and the previous 79 quarterly observations of a sector’s CAPE ratio.
64The winsorization then sets the four highest CAPE observations of the 80 CAPE observations used for the computation of the
long-term average to the level of the fifth-highest observation and the four lowest observations to the fifth-lowest observation.
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Figure 13: Whereas Figure 4 depicts the CAPE ratio for the overall stock market (All Stocks), Industrials, Utilities,
and Railroads, this figure shows the Relative CAPE indicator. The frequency is again quarterly and observations
cover the time period from the end of the third quarter in 1902 until the end of the fourth quarter of 2012. Relative
CAPE in a given quarter for each of the four time series is the ratio of this quarter’s CAPE and a modified, twenty-
year average of that time series’ history of CAPE ratios, up to and including the current CAPE ratio. We modify a
time series’ 80 CAPE observations (twenty years of quarterly data) that enter the long-term average of CAPE ratios
in the sense that we winsorize the top and the bottom at the 5% level.
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resulting simulation-based p-value for the overall stock market is 0.0689, which still provides considerable evidence
of predictability, even in the presence of the outlined normalization of the CAPE ratio for the overall stock market.
Reconsidering the market-based evidence of the predictive ability of the Relative CAPE from the perspective of the
tertile-bars paints a much more calming picture about the effectiveness of the Relative CAPE indicator, even for
the overall stock market. Although the differences in average returns are less pronounced compared to the bars for
the CAPE ratio, there is still a clear monotonicity and the first tertile’s average exceeds that of the third tercile by
approximately 4%.
Industrials display a negative correlation between the Relative CAPE indicator and subsequent long-term returns
that exceeds −48%, which is only an drop (in the strength of the association) of about 5% compared to the evidence for
the CAPE ratio. The associated simulation-based p-value is 0.0281, emphasizing the incompatibility of the observed
correlation with the assumption of unpredictable returns. Figure 8 complements the evidence, again displaying a
clear monotonicity pattern across the tertiles as well as a difference between the average return for the first and the
third tertile of approximately 6%. The evidence in favor of the predictive ability of the Relative CAPE indicator
is similarly strong for the Utilities sector. Even though the correlation number in Figure 9 moves more than 20%
closer to zero correlation to a level slighty less than −39%, the simulation-based p-value low at 0.0671. Moreover,
the difference between the average return of the first and third tertile in Figure 10 is approximately 4.5%.
Finally, the correlation of the Railroads sector drops from approximately −34% to approximately −20%, a cor-
relation that translates into a simulation-based p-value of 0.2656, which means that the Railroads sector continues
to provide the relatively weakest evidence in favor of a sector’s CAPE ratio to predict subsequent returns. Figure
12 complements the notion of return predictability for this particular sector by showing a clear, albeit somewhat
attenuated in comparison to the left panel, monotonicity across the tertiles with a maximum difference in the average
returns close to 3%.
Taking all of this evidence into account, the normalization involved in the creation of the Relative CAPE indicator
appears to leave the overall predictive ability of the CAPE ratio unchanged, while at the same time addressing
important concerns on the path to using the CAPE ratio to assess the performance of sectors relative to each other.
Observe in Figure 13 that the Relative CAPE indicator is not consistently lower for Railroads compared to Utilities
or Railroads between the mid 1940s and the 1970s. Moreover, after the mid-1990s, the shift upwards in the CAPE
ratio for Railroads, as evidenced by in Figure 4, is offset by an increase in the denominator, the long-term average
of the Railroads sector’s CAPE ratio, making for a more consistent fit of the scatter plot in Figure 11 when using
Relative CAPE.
Table 1 concludes the discussion of the interaction between the CAPE ratio or the Relative CAPE indicator of
a specific sector and that same sector’s long-term return. It employs the same methodology as has been used for
Figures 5 through 12, but investigates the impact of different starting dates for the sample, for which the correlations
are computed. The first column, included as a reference, contains the correlations depicted in Figures 5, 7, 9, as well
as 11, whereas the second column computes the correlations when the sample is restricted to the period between the
fourth quarter of 1935 and the fourth quarter of 2012. During this period, we solely rely on information from the
Security Price Index Record and the Analysts’ Handbook publications from Standard & Poor’s. This does however
not mean that we completely disregard data from Cowles (1939), as we still rely on it for the computation of the
CAPE ratios and the history of the CAPE ratios needed for the calculation of the Relative CAPE indicator. The
third column of Table 1 limits the data to the last 50 years of the sample to give a sense of the most recent history.
Simulation-based p-values are included in parentheses below the associated correlation numbers.
The reported results in Table 1 exhibit robustness with regard to the choice of the time horizon. All correlations
are negative and rather similar in size across the different sample periods, although the pattern for the simulation-
based p-values outlines the impact of the sample length on the significance of the correlation coefficients against the
assumed unpredictability for returns that the simulation exercise is based on. The Railroads sector actually displays
the most interesting pattern, in that the correlations involving the CAPE ratio shrink towards zero, the shorter the
sample becomes. This has already become apparent from Figure 11 that clearly shows a difference in the left panel
brought about by the Railroads sector’s behavior at the end of the 20th century. At the same time, the right panel
of Figure 11 outlines the benefits of the construction of the Relative CAPE indicator, as it shows a much more





























































Table 1: This table shows the results for an analysis of the correlation between the CAPE ratio and the Relative
CAPE indicator, respectively, on the one hand and the subsequent annualized ten-year total return on the other
hand. We perform this analysis for the overall stock market, the Industrials sector, the Utilities sector, as well as
the Railroads sector. The first column reports the correlations depicted in Figures 5, 7, 9, as well as 11, whereas the
second and third column change the start date of the analysis, leaving the end date fixed at the end of the second
quarter of 2002, which is the last quarter, for which we can compute a ten-year return. The fourth quarter of 1935
refers to the first quarter, at which we use data from S&P resources only, and the fourth quarter of 1962 is the quarter
that allows us to single out the final fifty years of the dataset. Each cell lists a correlation number accompanied by
a simulation-based p-value in parentheses.
consistent scatter diagram. This is confirmed by the results in Table 1 for Railroads in connection with the Relative
CAPE indicator, as the correlations become substantially stronger associated with actually smaller simulation-based
p-values, as the sample decreases in size.
5.3 Long-Term Return Differences between Sectors and the Relative CAPE Indicator
Whereas the previous analysis has focused on the interaction between the CAPE ratio or the Relative CAPE indicator
of a specific sector and that same sector’s long-term return, we will now focus attention on pairwise comparisons
across sectors. It is the standardization involved in the construction of the Relative CAPE indicator that enables
us to sensibly compare this indicator across sectors. We will therefore address the question whether a sector that
appears more undervalued than another sector according to a comparison of the respective Relative CAPE indicators,
has higher subsequent long-term returns, and vice versa.
For this purpose, we construct two variables that measure differences across sectors. The first variable is the
percentage difference of the Relative CAPE indicators of two sectors, defined as the division of the Relative CAPE
indicator of the one sector and the Relative CAPE indicator of the other sector, with 1 being subtracted from the
resulting ratio. If, for example, the percentage difference between the Relative CAPE indicator of the Industrials
sector and the indicator of the Utilities sector is less than zero, the Industrials sector is relatively more undervalued
than the Utilties sector, an assessment that is reversed in case that the percentage difference is bigger than zero. The
second variable is the difference of the logarithm of the non-annualized long-term total returns for the two sectors
under consideration, where we again choose a time horizon of ten years and consider inflation-adjusted returns. As
previously, the time horizon, over which the return is computed, starts in the beginning of the quarter subsequent
to the quarter, for which the corresponding Relative CAPE indicators are assessed, providing a genuine separation
between valuation and subsequent returns.
Figure 14 focuses on the Industrials and the Utilities sector and displays the association between the percentage
difference of the Relative CAPE indicators and the long-term return differences in two different ways. Whereas the
top panel shows the time series of both differences, the bottom panel shows a scatter diagram. Both panels start
5 CAPE-BASED COMPARISONS ACROSS SECTORS 33
with the difference in the Relative CAPE indicators at the end of the third quarter of 1902 and end at the end of
the fourth quarter of 2002. Correspondingly, the first long-term return is computed between the beginning of the
fourth quarter of 1902 and the beginning of the fourth quarter of 1912, whereas the final long-term return captures
the period between the beginning of the first quarter of 2003 and the beginning of the first quarter of 2013.
The top panel shows that the difference in the Relative CAPE indicator for the two sectors moves in the opposite
direction from the differences in subsequent long-term returns and the scatter diagram confirms the negative corre-
lation. The correlation coefficient for the two difference series for Industrials and Utilities turns out to be almost
−40%. Percentage differences of the Relative CAPE indicator clearly account for the biggest differences in long-
term returns, with Utilities outperforming as measured by the ten-year returns around 1920 and around 2000 and
Industrials outperforming around 1930 and in the late 1980s.
Similar to the simulations addressing the statistical significance of the correlation between the CAPE ratio as well
as the Relative CAPE indicator and subsequent long-term returns for the overall market as well as for the sectors
individually, we have performed simulations for the present situation of cross-sectional predictions. For this purpose,
we simulate both sectors’ quarterly real, total-return indices simultaneously, matching their respective empirical
distributions. Moreover, analogously to the simulation for an individual sector, we impose an AR(1) structure for
the natural logarithm of each sectors’ CAPE ratio. In addition to matching the mean and the standard deviation of
the error terms of the underlying valuation processes, we match the four-by-four covariance matrix arising from the
two processes of the sectors under consideration.
The simulated realizations of the innovations provide us with 100, 000 paths for the returns and the valuation
ratios. We subsequently build the Relative CAPE indicator as well as the long-term total return index for each of the
two sectors to then compute the differences in the way that they are being displayed in the subsequent correlation
plots. With regard to the correlation of approximately −40% as displayed in Figure 14, it turns out that this
simulation procedure yields an associated p-value of 0.0698, providing fairly definite evidence against the notion that
the apparent negative association is compatible with unpredictable sector returns.
Figure 15 is concerned with the pairwise comparison of the Industrials and the Railroads sector, but is otherwise
analogous to Figure 14. The correlation between the two time series is also negative, as predicted, at slightly lower
than −10%. As in the case of the comparison between the Industrials and the Utilities sector in Figure 14, the bigger
oscillations between the Industrials sector and the Railroads sector are well accounted for by the percentage differences
of the Relative CAPE indicator. In much of the years of the Great Depression, in the 1930s, the Industrials sector
had a higher Relative CAPE indicator than did the Railroads sector and, as our theory predicts, subsequent ten-year
returns were lower. Around 1980, the Railroads sector had a relatively higher Relative CAPE indicator. This was
the time of the 1980 Staggers Act, which deregulated railroads, and of other actions weakening railroad labor unions.
Moreover, in 1995, the railroads’ regulator, the Interstate Commerce Department, a 1887 creation of Congress, was
eliminated, replaced only with a much weaker Surface Transportation Board. These events manifestly deregulated
railroads and got them onto a more profit-oriented trajectory after the mid-1990s. But it appears that the stock
market overreacted at the time of the 1980s Staggers Act, so that the Relative CAPE indicator of the Railroads
sector was higher than that for the Industrials sector, and indeed, the Industrials sector fared much better in terms
of subsequent ten-year returns. After the late 1990s, the increased earnings produced by deregulation finally had
their impact by raising the denominator of the CAPE ratio of the Railroads sector, at the same time that widespread
enthusiasm for technology stocks and other components of the Industrials sector shifted the CAPE ratio, and the
Relative CAPE indicator accordingly, of the Industrials sector way above that of the Railroads sector. The suggested
shift in investment from the Industrials sector to the Railroads sector was, as we now know with hindsight, a very
suitable step to take at that time.
The simulation-based p-value for this cross-sectional correlation result is quite high at 0.4185, raising concerns
that the displayed assocation might very well be compatible with a framework in which returns are completely
unforecastable. It will however turn out that this evidence is, as in the subsequent cross-sectional correlation plot
involving the Utilities and the Railroads sector, dominated by the earliest part of the sample. Indeed, the notion of
unpredictable returns will be convincingly rejected when restricting attention to forecasting cross-sectional returns
starting in the 1930s or even starting in the 1960s, which is evidenced by Table 2 below.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 14: This figure analyzes percentage differences in the Relative CAPE indicator between the Industrials and
the Utilities sector and displays their relation with differences in subsequent ten-year returns for the two sectors.
The Relative CAPE indicators for the two sectors are quarterly in frequency and their time series starts at the
end of the third quarter of 1902. Because of the consideration of subsequent ten-year returns, the last observation
of this indicator that is incorporated in this figure is from the end of the second quarter of 2002. We compute
the percentage difference between the two indicators as the Relative CAPE indicator for Industrials divided by the
indicator for Utilities minus one. In order to bring both time series to a very similar scale, we compute the ten-year
return difference as the log-difference of the real total gross return (non-annualized) in the Industrials sector minus
the real total gross return (non-annualized) in the Utilities sector, leading to a close approximation to the return
difference. The left panel shows the time series of both difference series (dashed black line: return, solid red line:
Relative CAPE), whereas the right panel restates the very same information in a scatter diagram.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 15: This figure is the analogue of Figure 10, looking at differences between Industrials and Railroads instead
of Industrials and Utilities.
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Correlation between Differences in
Relative CAPE Indicator and

























Table 2: This table shows the results for an analysis of the correlation between the percentage difference in the
Relative CAPE indicator for a pair of sectors and the difference in the logarithm of the non-annualized ten-year total
gross return. We perform this analysis for three pairs, Industrials and Utilities, Industrials and Railroads, as well
as Railroads and Utilities. The first column reports the correlations depicted in Figures 10 through 12, whereas the
second and third column change the start date of the analysis, leaving the end date fixed at the end of the second
quarter of 2002, which is the last quarter, for which we can compute a ten-year return. The fourth quarter of 1935
refers to the first quarter, at which we use data from S&P resources only, and the second quarter of 1962 is the
quarter that allows us to single out the final fifty years of the dataset.
Figure 16 contains the final pairwise comparison, investigating differences in the Relative CAPE indicator and
subsequent long-term returns for the Railroads sector paired with the Utilities sector. The correlation evidence
between these sectors is the weakest, only amounting to an overall total of approximately −4% with an associated
simulation-based p-value of 0.5174. It however becomes apparent from the top panel of Figure 16 that much of
the lack of strength of the overall correlation can be attributed to the first forty years of the sample, in which the
Relative CAPE indicator does a poor job of capturing subsequent long-term return differences. The evidence in
favor of a negative association between differences in the Relative CAPE indicator and subsequent long-term returns
changes in the second half of the 20th century. For example, percentage differences in the indicator capture the
long-term return profile in the 1970s and shortly after the beginning of the 1980s very well. Moreover, differences
in the indicator convincingly deliver the correct prediction in the 2000s when they identify the Railroads sector as
undervalued compared to the Utilities sector.
Given the evidence of Figure 16, it appears that the correlation between the differences in the Relative CAPE
indicator for the Railroads and the Utilities sector, when compared to differences in subsequent long-term returns
ought to decrease, i.e. become stronger, when looking only at the more recent part of the sample. Table 2 provides
this information for the same time periods that have been displayed in Table 1. Indeed, the correlation becomes
substantially stronger, decreasing to less than −70% for the comparison between the Railroads and the Utilities
sector. This change is however not confined to the comparison between these two sectors. The correlations drop
markedly for all three pairwise comparisons, surpassing the −70% mark for each pair, when attention is limited to
only the last fifty years of the sample. Marked drops in the simulation-based p-values accompany the decreasing trend
in correlations, as the sample period restricts attention more and more on the most recent time period. The marked
drops in p-values show that the increase in the strength of the correlation between differences in the Relative CAPE
indicator and subsequent long-term return differences is much too strong to be solely attributed to a decrease in the
length of the underlying sample. Focusing on the last fifty years of the sample, there is therefore very convincing
evidence that the degree to which differences in the Relative CAPE indicator are capable of predicting differences
in long-term returns fundamentally rejects the notion that returns - and by extension differences in returns - are
unpredictable.
6 Predicting the Long-Term Growth of Ten-Year Average Earnings
Starting from the evidence presented in Figure 4 that the CAPE ratio for the overall stock market as well as for the
three sectors Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads is mean-reverting, one might formulate alternative hypotheses about
the predictive ability of the CAPE ratio. Instead of the hypothesis that it is the numerator of the CAPE ratio that







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 16: This figure is the analogue of Figure 10, looking at differences between Railroads and Utilities instead of
Industrials and Utilities.
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brings the CAPE ratio back to its mean, which translates into the predictive ability of the CAPE ratio for subsequent
(long-term) returns, one might postulate that it could also be the numerator of the ratio - the ten-year average of
inflation- as well as total-return-adjusted earnings - that ensures reversion to the mean. Correspondingly, this would
translate into predictability of the CAPE ratio for the (long-term) change in this long-term earnings average. As
the lack of return predictability rests at the heart of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, these kinds of predictability
patterns in subsequent earnings would be the natural explanation for any variation in the CAPE ratio.
On the level of the overall stock market, this argument has also been presented in Campbell and Shiller (1998,
2001), who start out from the implications of the premise of the mean-reversion-property of valuation ratios. For
both the dividend-price ratio as well as their version of the CAPE ratio, they present evidence against the notion of
earnings predictability and in favor of return predictability. It is the purpose of this section to extend the analysis
in Campbell and Shiller (1998, 2001) and complement the convincing evidence from Section 4 for the ability of the
CAPE ratio to forecast long-term real total returns by disproving the notion that the CAPE ratio has a strong impact
on the subsequent growth in the long-term average of earnings. Starting from the mean-reversion-property of the
CAPE ratio, the predicted sign of the association is positive, i.e. the hypothesis is that low values of the CAPE ratio,
for example, predict negative growth in the long-term average of earnings, and vice versa.
Practically, we use the time series of earnings averages used in the construction of the CAPE ratio, as outlined
in Section 4. As earnings are only available annually until the middle of the 1930s, we restrict the time series under
consideration to start with the ten-year average ending in the first quarter of 1936 in order to ensure sufficient
quarterly variation in the long-term average of earnings. The particular observation at the end of the first quarter
of 1936 is the average used for the CAPE ratio at the end of the third quarter of 1936 because of the earnings lag
to take into account corporate earnings reporting. We then caculate the annualized ten-year change in this ten-year
average.65 Each pair of observations to assess the predictive ability of the CAPE ratio for subsequent earnings growth
uses a given observation of the CAPE ratio together with the subsequent ten-year growth rate of the numerator of
this very observation of the CAPE ratio. All scatters thereby start with the CAPE ratio at the end of the third
quarter of 1936 and end with the CAPE ratio at the end of the fourth quarter of 2002.
The simulation from Section 4 that allowed us to test the degree to which the scatter evidence is compatible
with the notion of unpredictable returns will also enable us to calculate simulation-based p-values for the association
between the CAPE ratio and subsequent (long-term) growth rates in 10-year average earnings. For each pair of the
simulated logarithm of the simulated real total-return index and the simulated logarithm of the CAPE ratio, we obtain
the corresponding simulation of 10-year average (real and total-return adjusted) earnings by taking the difference.
From that, we can calculate the ten-year change and calculate a distribution for the correlation of the CAPE ratio and
long-term changes in the 10-year average earnings, appropriately truncating the time series for the CAPE ratio and
the earnings growth rate to reflect the shortened underlying time series. Importantly, the simulated p-value now refers
to the probability mass of the distribution that exceeds the underlying correlation, as our conjectured association
between the CAPE ratio and earnings growth is positive. Finally, as in Section 4, we can extend the correlation
analysis to the Relative CAPE indicator, by simply replacing the CAPE ratio by this indicator, as outlined above.
Figure 17 displays the connection between the CAPE ratio and subsequent long-term earnings growth for the
overall stock market. The correlation coefficient is −14.55% in the left panel, which focuses on the CAPE ratio. This
correlation actually has the wrong sign to be compatible with the notion that it is the denominator of the CAPE
ratio that ensures the mean-reversion property of the valuation ratio. Moreover, the simulation-based p-value derived
under the assumption that returns are unpredictable is 0.9993, i.e. there are barely any iterations of the simulation
that yield a correlation as small as the underlying data. In conjunction with the evidence from the return scatters
from Section 4, the evidence convincingly points to the numerator of the CAPE ratio, and not the denominator, as
the predominant force behind the mean-reversion of the CAPE ratio for the overall stock market.
The right panel of Figure 17, using the Relative CAPE indicator instead of the CAPE ratio, shows a very similar
pattern to the left panel. The correlation is −4.58% and again has the wrong sign. The associated simulation-based
65For the sake of completeness, we would like to point out again that, as explained in Section 4 and Appendix B, the time series of
averaged earnings used in the denominator of the CAPE ratio at the transition from annual to quarterly earnings actually uses slightly
varying time horizons for the earnings average, ranging from 10 years to ten 10.75 years. We will however ignore this complication
subsequently and refer to the denominator of the CAPE ratio as a ten-year average.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 17: The left panel depicts a scatter diagram of the CAPE ratio (discussed in Section 4) of the overall stock
market and the right panel depicts the analogous scatter using Relative CAPE (discussed in Section 5). On the x-axis
of the left panel, we display the CAPE ratio of the overall market, incorporating the transition to real numbers and
to total return numbers. It is measured at the end of each quarter starting in the third quarter of 1902 until the
fourth quarter of 2002. The x-axis of the right panel captures the Relative CAPE of the overall market, using the
same timing convention as for CAPE ratio. The y-axis, which is common to both panels, captures the annualized
ten-year growth rate of the denominator of the CAPE ratio, which in principle is a ten-year average of the 12-month
trailing sum of earnings, as measured from the current observation of the CAPE ratio to the corresponding CAPE
ratio ten years later. For details with regard to the actual calculation of the denominator of the CAPE ratio, please
refer to Section 4 as well as to Appendix B. We have labeled each point in the scatters by the time, at which the
initial CAPE ratio or the Relative CAPE indicator, respectively, at the beginning of the ten-year period is computed
is computed. Each entry contains the year followed by the number of the quarter.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 18: This figure is the analogue of Figure 18 for the Industrials sector instead of the overall stock market.
7 SENSITIVITY STUDY FOR THE CAPE-BASED CORRELATION ANALYSES 41
p-value is 0.9929.
Figure 18 displays scatters of valuation ratios and subsequent long-term growth in the ten-year average of earnings
for the Industrials sector. It is again the case both the correlation for the CAPE ratio in the left panel as well as
the Relative CAPE indicator in the right panel are negative at −12.82% and −11.69%, respectively, contrary to the
hypothesized sign. Moreover, there is again considerable evidence against the notion of earnings predictability from
the simulation-based p-values, which amount to 0.9992 and 0.9958, respectively.
When looking at the Utilities sector, it becomes evident that the correlation for both the scatter involving the
CAPE ratio as well as the Relative CAPE indicator is in the hypothesized direction. The correlations equal 36.85%
in the panel for the CAPE ratio and 26.22% on the right hand side that uses the Relative CAPE indicator. However,
even though their sign is consistent with the predictability and their absolute value is sizeable, it turn out that the
associated simulation-based p-values of the correlations are 0.8328 for the left panel and 0.8952 for the right panel,
preserving the consistency of the evidence against the notion that the mean-reversion of the CAPE ratio arises from
the earnings average in the denominator.
For the Railroads sector as the final sector, the correlation pattern is curious, as the sign flips from positive for the
CAPE ratio to negative when applying the transformation to the Relative CAPE indicator. The correlation values
are 21.14% for the CAPE ratio and −12.60% for the Relative CAPE indicator, with associated simulation-based
p-values of 0.9512 and 0.9962, again rejecting the notion of the predictive ability of the CAPE ratio for subsequent
earnings growth rates.
Given the degree to which the correlation results change in Sections 4 and 5 when one considers a shorter time
horizon, it is worthwhile reconsidering the association between the CAPE ratio and the Relative CAPE indicator with
the long-term growth rate of ten-year average earnings when limiting attention to the last fifty years of the time period
under consideration.66It turns out that this limitation causes the correlation pattern for the overall stock market, for
the Industrials sector, as well as for the Railroads sector to become much more consistent with the conjecture that
the CAPE ratio as well as the Relative CAPE indicator are positively associated with subsequent growth in 10-year
average earnings. Explicitly, the correlations are 40.10% for the CAPE ratio and 59.67% for the Relative CAPE
indicator in the case of the overall stock market, 50.69% and 54.83%, respectively, for the Industrials sector, and
52.73% and 14.33%, respectively, in the case of the Railroads sector. However, the simulation-based p-values continue
to speak against a strong and considerable notion of earnings growth predictability, as they amount to 0.6426 for the
CAPE ratio and 0.4024 for the Relative CAPE indicator for the overall stock market, 0.5402 and 0.4970, respectively,
for the Industrials sector, as well as 0.4495 and 0.8861 for the Railroads sector. Curiously, the correlation for the
Utilities sector, which has had the predicted sign when looking at the longer sample, is now negative at −0.0442 for
the CAPE ratio and −0.3950 for the Relative CAPE indicator, which translates into p-value of 0.9693 and 0.9977,
respectively.
Overall, it becomes very evident that the question whether it is the numerator (prices) or the denominator (10-
year average earnings) that ensures the mean-reversion of the CAPE ratio can clearly be answered un favor of the
numerator, therefore establishing the notion of return predictability for the CAPE-ratio not only for the overall stock
market, as already analyzed for data up to the 1990s by Campbell and Shiller (1998, 2001), but also for the three
sectors Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads.
7 Sensitivity Study for the CAPE-Based Correlation Analyses
When analyzing the predictive ability of the CAPE ratio as well as the Relative CAPE indicator for subsequent long-
term returns, we have fixed the return-horizon, over which we consider subsequent returns, to ten years. While this
is certainly motivated by the notion that the CAPE ratio by its very definition is supposed to capture the long-term
over- or undervaluation of the overall stock market or a constituent sector, the consideration of ten-year returns might
appear ad-hoc.
66This limitation corresponds to the third scenario analyzed above in Sections 4 and 5. Observe that the overall horizon analyzed for
the correlation analysis involving earnings vaguely corresponds to the second scenario, as we cannot extend these correlation analyses
farther back because of the annual reporting frequency of earnings.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 19: This figure is the analogue of Figure 5 for the Utilities sector instead of the overall stock market.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 20: This figure is the analogue of Figure 5 for the Railroads sector instead of the overall stock market.
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Figure 21: This figure displays a sensitivity study of the correlation analysis as displayed in the left panel of Figure
5. The horizon for subsequent returns varies between 1 and 10 years in annual increments (left axis), which is the
same variation imposed on the horizon for the average of earnings in the denominator of the CAPE ratio (right axis).
10 years for the earnings horizon correspond to the CAPE ratio as defined above, whereas 1 year leads to the more
classic price-earnings ratio. Except for the differences in horizons, the procedure to calculate the long-term returns as
well as the variant of the CAPE ratio is as described in Sections 3 and 4. The full sample time series for the CAPE
ratio in each scenario homogenously starts in the third quarter of 1902 and ends in the fourth quarter of 2002 and
subsequent returns are considered correspondingly. The resulting correlation as well as the associated p-values are
displayed in the top two panels. The calculation for the simulation-based p-values follows the description in Section
4 with minor adaptations to reflect the changes in horizons. The middle and the bottom pair are analogous to the
top pair, but restrict the sample under consideration to the time starting with the fourth quarter of 1935 and the
fourth quarter of 1962, which are the same starting points as in Section 4.
Moreover, the very definition of the CAPE ratio also involves a choice on a time horizon, which is the horizon
for the calculation of the earnings-average in the denominator of the valuation ratio. While the current definition is
certainly in line with the way that the ratio is used in Campbell and Shiller (1988, 1989, 1998, 2001) and lies at the
upper end of the spectrum for longer-term earnings to be used in conjunction with prices in valuation exercises as
advcated by Graham and Dodd (1934),67 the use of ten-yar averages for earnings is nevertheless an ad-hoc assumption.
In order to analyze the impact of these two assumptions on (a) the correlation between the CAPE-ratio as well as
the Relative CAPE indicator and subsequent returns for the overall stock market and the three individual sectors and
(b) the correlation between differences in the Relative CAPE indicator and differences in subsequent returns when
one takes a cross-sectional perspective, we perform a sensitivity study for these correlation analyses. For this purpose,
we vary both the subsequent return horizon as well as the horizon, over which we compute the average of earnings
in the denomiator of the CAPE ratio, between 1 and 10 years in annual increments. Except for these differences
in the earnings horizon, we excatly follow the procedures for the calculation of the CAPE ratio and of the Relative
CAPE indicator as outlined in Sections 4 and 5, respetively. Moreover, we preserve the notion of inflation-adjusted
returns that have been made invariant to corporate payout policy through the transition to total returns as detailed
in Section 2. Finally, we guarantee the comparability of the correlation results across different horizon pairs by
truncating all samples used for the calculation of the correlations to have a first CAPE68 observation (for the ratio
67See the respective quote in the introductory paragraphs.
68Even though the CAPE ratio is formally defined in terms of ten-year average earnings, we will for ease of reference refer to the ratio
originating from all variations in the underlying earnings horizon as the CAPE ratio.should
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Figure 22: This figure is analogous to Figure 21, but it employs the Relative CAPE indicator instead of the CAPE
ratio for the sensitivity study of the correlation involving the overall stock market.
as well as for the Relative CAPE indicator) at the end of the third quarter of 1902 and the last one in December
2002. Correspondingly, subsequent returns begin in the beginning of the fourth quarter of 1903 and the last return
observation originates from the beginning of the first quarter of 2003.
Observe that the original analysis from Sections 4 and 5 corresponds to the pair (10,10) for the return horizon
and the earnings horizon. Moreover, the consideration of only a single year for the average of earnings provides
a version of the more classic price-earnings and allows us to directly compare the price-earnings ratio against the
CAPE ratio using a ten-year average of earnings.69Given the additional variation in the horizon for returns, we cannot
only perform this comparison for a single long-term horizon, but for a whole range of horizons ranging from rather
short-term (1 year) to long-term (10 years). In the figures below detailing the results of the sensitivity analysis, we
initially focus on the relation between the variants of the CAPE ratio and subsequent returns for the overall stock
market as well as for the Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads sector and display the correlation numbers as well
as their associated simulation-based p-values. We obtain these p-values by repeating the simulation methodology
introduced in Section 4 in connection with the correlation analysis involving the CAPE ratio and in Section 5 when
analyzing correlations involving the Relative CAPE indicator, with only minor modifications reflecting the changes
in the horizons for returns and the averages or earnings. Finally, we display all results for three choices of the time
horizon, the full sample since 1902, the sample since the fourth quarter of 1935, and the final fifty years of the sample.
These are exactly the same scenarios as already considered in Tables 1 and 2.
Figure 21 contains the sensitivity study for the correlation between variants of the CAPE ratio and subsequent
returns for the overall stock market. It is indeed the point (10,10), which corresponds to the original correlation
analysis as captured by Figure 5, that displays the most negative correlation. Both increases in the return horizon
for subsequent returns as well as shorter-term averages for the earnings entering the denominator of the CAPE ratio
lead to increases in correlation, i.e. a less pronounced association of the respective variant of the CAPE ratio with
subsequent returns. Focusing on the comparison between the price-earnings ratio (earnings-horizon of 1 year) and
the formal CAPE ratio (earnings-horizon of 10 years) for the full sample, the evidence for the overall stock market
69As we apply the inflation- as well as the total-return adjustment for earnings at the already aggregated level of 12-month trailing
earnings, it will be the case that both adjustments nearly cancel out when the horizon for the average of earnings is only a single year, as
analogous adjustment operations apply to both the numerator as well as the denominator of the CAPE ratio. The fact that the operations
do not cancel ou texactly is due to the six-month lag that we impose on earnings.
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Figure 24: This figure is analogous to Figure 22, but it employs the Relative CAPE indicator instead of the CAPE
ratio for the sensitivity study of the correlation involving the Industrials sector.
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Figure 25: This figure is the analogue to Figure 21 for the Utilities sector instead of the overall stock market.
clearly underlines the appropriateness of the long-term averaging of earnings, as the correlations for the CAPE
ratio are consistently lower than those for the price-earnings ratio for all return horizons under consideration. The
associated simulation-based p-values for the full sample reject the notion that the increased strength in the negative
association between the CAPE ratio and subsequent returns for longer return horizons is solely an artefact of statistical
spuriousness, as the p-values remain nearly constant for varying return horizons, particularly for the original CAPE
ratio (earnings horizon of 10 years). Moreover, the correlations for the original CAPE ratio are not only stronger,
but they also exhibit lower p-values than the price-earnings ratio for the full sample. This does not necessarily hold
for the shortened samples, but - as evidenced by the two bottom right hand side panels - the statistical significance
of the correlation results for the overall market suffers rather substantially in general, which causes us to discount
the seemingly lower p-values of the price-earnings ratio for the shorter samples.
If instead of the CAPE ratio, one considers the Relative CAPE indicator’s correlation with subsequent returns,
as displayed in Figure 22, the evidence in terms of the correlation for the full sample is very similar to the evidence
presented in Figure 21 for the CAPE ratio. Moreover, the improvement in the p-values of the original CAPE ratio
when compared to the price-earnings ratio is quite substantial when one looks across all return horizons jointly. For
the shortened samples in the bottom panels, the evidence for the strength of the negative association between the
valuation measure and subsequent returns persists, whereas the difference across horizons for the earnings average
becomes less pronounced. The latter effect is however less problematic given the substantially increased p-values for
the shortened sample, as also evidenced by Figure 21.
Figures 23 and 24 present the results of the sensitivity study for the Industrials sector. In the context of this
sector, it is particularly noteworthy that the correlation evidence for the price-earnings ratio (earnings horizon of
1 year) for both the CAPE ratio as well as the Relative CAPE indicator is dramatically worse than for earnings
horizons bigger than a year. However, even beyond the one-year horizon, there is steady decline in the correlation
as one uses longer averages for the earnings in the denominator of the CAPE ratio, particularly in the surface plot
involving the Relative CAPE indicator in the full-sample-scenario.
In the case of the Utilities sector, presented in Figures 25 and 26, there is substantial evidence on how the
association between variants of the CAPE ratio as well as of the Relative CAPE indicator strengthens, as the horizon
for subsequent returns increases. In the sensitivity analyses for the CAPE ratio, these higher degrees of association
are even so strong, as to overcome the shortening of the underlying sample and still to produce very low p-values.
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Figure 26: This figure is analogous to Figure 25, but it employs the Relative CAPE indicator instead of the CAPE
ratio for the sensitivity study of the correlation involving the Utilities sector.
With regard to changes in the earnings horizon for the denominator of the CAPE ratio, there is evidence for the
superiority of the CAPE ratio when compared with the price-earnings ratio, particularly for the full sample and the
scenario of only the most recent fifty years of the sample (since 1962), although less pronounced than for the overall
stock market and the Industrials sector.
In contrast, the drop from shorter earnings averages to longer averages and ultimately a ten-year average is quite
pronounced for the Railroads sector for both the CAPE ratio as well as the Relative CAPE indicator, as displayed
by Figures 27 and 28, respectively. This is especially true for longer return horizons, although some caution is
necessary to assess te results for longer return horizons, as it is generally not the case that increase in the strength
of the negative association between either the CAPE ratio or the Relative CAPE indicator and subsequent returns
outweighs the more pronounced statistical issues, which is why the Railroads sector generally shows increases in the
associated simulation-based p-values, as the return horizon increases toward ten years.
Subsequent to the sensitivity study on the level of the overall stock market and on the level of individual sectors, we
now turn attention to the kind of cross-sectional analysis that we have performed in Section 5, that is the correlation
between percentage differences in the Relative CAPE indicator compared to logarithmic differences in subsequent
returns for pairs of sectors. Except for minor adaptations to reflect the changes in the horizons for returns and the
average of earnings, which will enter the CAPE ratio and subsequently the Relative CAPE indicator for a given
sector, we follow the methodology outlined in Section 5 for this part of the sensitivity study. The same also applies
to the calculation of the simulation-based p-values. Moreover, we look at a uniform sample across all instances of the
sensitivity study by focusing on samples for the Relative CAPE indicator from the end of the third quarter of 1902
until the end of the fourth quarter of 2002. We then consider returns from the beginning of the subsequent quarter
until the specified return horizon correspondingly and calculate the logarithmic difference between the non-annualized
returns of two sectors. As in the previous sensitivity studies, we display three scenarios, the full sample since 1902,
the sample since 1935, and finally the final fifty years worth of data starting in 1962.
Considering the comparison between the Industrials sector and the Utilities sector, it first becomes apparent that
the correlation value at (10, 10), corresponding to the original setting from Section 5, remains the lowest, even across
the different time horizons under consideration. An interesting pattern arises in the comparison of these three time
horizons. Whereas the full sample already shows that longer return horizons and also that longer-term averages for
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Figure 28: This figure is analogous to Figure 21, but it employs the Relative CAPE indicator instead of the CAPE
ratio for the sensitivity study of the correlation involving the Railroads sector.
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Figure 29: This figure displays a sensitivity study of the correlation analysis as displayed in the cross-sectional
comparison between the Industrials and the Utilities sector of Figure 14. The horizon, over which we calculate
subsequent returns, varies between 1 and 10 years in annual increments (left axis). We then compare the differences
in these returns to differences in variants of the Relative CAPE indicator. For the calculation of the Relative CAPE
indicator, we impose the same variation between 1 and 10 years in annual increments for the horizon of the average
of earnings in the denominator of the CAPE ratio (right axis). 10 years for the earnings horizon correspond to the
Relative CAPE indicator as defined above, whereas 1 year leads to a version of the Relative CAPE indicator derived
from the more classic price-earnings ratio. Except for the differences in horizons, the procedure to calculate the
long-term returns as well as the variants of the Relative CAPE indicator is as described in Sections 3 through 5. The
full sample time series for the Relative CAPE indicator of each of the two sectors in each scenario homogenously
starts in the third quarter of 1902 and ends in the fourth quarter of 2002 and subsequent returns are considered
correspondingly. The resulting correlation as well as the associated p-values are displayed in the top two panels. The
procedure for the simulation-based p-values follows the decsription in Section 5.3 with only minor adaptations for
the changes in the horizons. The middle and the bottom pair are analogous to the top pair, but restrict the sample
under consideration to the time starting with the fourth quarter of 1935 and the fourth quarter of 1962, which are
the same starting points as in Section 4.
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Figure 30: This figure is the analogue to Figure 29 displaying the sensitivity study for differences in the Relative
CAPE indicator as well as subsequent returns the Industrials sector and the Railroads sector instead of the differences
between the Industrials and the Utilities sector.
the earnings in the denominator of the CAPE ratio both lead to a stronger negative association between differences
in the Relative CAPE indicator and differences in subsequent returns, these effects definitely become substantially
stronger for the sample that focuses on the last fifty years of data. Moreover, while the p-values in the full sample tend
to support the notion that the correlation results are not driven statistical spuriousness and are in fact not compatible
with the assumption of unpredictable returns, the negative association for the final fifty years is supported much more
strongly by the simulation results.
Focusing again on the correlation evidence, we would like to point out that - when focusing on the ten-year return
horizon - there is a difference between the price-earnings ratio (earnings horizon of 1 year) and the CAPE ratio
(earnings horizon of 10 years) that amounts to nearly 30%. This is strong evidence in favor of the notion of long-term
earnings averages for value investing criteria, in particular given the context of cross-sectional comparisons of this
sensitivity study.
When focusing on the comparison between the Industrials and the Railroads sector (Figure 30) as well as on
the comparison between the Railroads and the Utilities sector (Figure 31), the same patterns as for the comparison
between the Industrials and the Utilities sector arise. The superiority of the notion of 10-year average earnings in
the denominator of the CAPE ratio as well as of the notion of ten-year subsequent returns to assess the long-term
investment performance becomes the most pronounced for the final fifty years of the overall sample. The evidence
in favor of the Relative CAPE indicator being able to predict cross-sectional return differences is then convincingly
supported by the simulation-based p-values, which strongly indicate that this association is incompatible with the
assumption of unpredictable returns, whereas this incompatibility is not nearly as convincingly established for the
upper two panels. Finally, particularly in the shorter-sample scenario, there continues to be a sizeable difference
in the degree of the negative association between differences in the Relative CAPE indicator and subsequent return
differences when comparing the more conventional price-earnings ratio with the CAPE ratio, reiterating the usefulness
of the notion of earnings averages in the computation of a long-term value measure, as it has been alluded to by
Graham and Dodd (1934).
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Figure 31: This figure is the analogue to Figure 29 displaying the sensitivity study for differences in the Relative
CAPE indicator as well as subsequent returns the Railroads sector and the Utilities sector instead of the differences
between the Industrials and the Utilities sector.
8 A Hypothetical Strategy Based on the Relative CAPE Indicator
8.1 Description of the Strategy
In this section, we explore a way to exploit the qualitative evidence in favor of CAPE as a signal of over- and under-
valuation in terms of a simple, hypothetical investment strategy, which rotates between the three sectors Industrials,
Utilities, and Railroads. Given that our strategy starts from only three assets, an important consideration for our
strategy is diversification. Because of this, it appears reasonable to construct a strategy that does not just build on
a single sector at each rebalancing date, as it would unnecessarily expose a hypothetical investor to the idiosyncratic
risk of that particular sector. The second characteristic of our strategy is quarterly rebalancing, i.e. we re-evaluate
the hypothetical investment position as frequently as our dataset permits. Doing so, we always incorporate the latest
available information in the allocation decision. Third, we consider a long-only strategy, as we consider short-selling,
particularly short-selling the sectors, as highly impractical until the very late part of the sample under consideration.
Finally, we are committed to the principle of simplicity for our hypothetical strategy.
We determine the allocation between the three sectors at each rebalancing date by a two-step process. In the first
step, we apply the core tenet of our strategy, the CAPE ratio or more explicitly the concept of the Relative CAPE
indicator, which allows us to discriminate the sectors by their degree of over- and undervaluation. In particular, we
use the Relative CAPE indicator of a sector to determine whether we consider it as overvalued. The second step
on the way to the allocation for a specific quarter involves a momentum consideration. This consideration arises
because of the so-called value trap. With quarterly rebalancing, CAPE - as a measure of over- and undervaluation
- has by its very nature as a long-term gauge of value a diminished ability to distinguish between a sector that is
undervalued and will rise again subsequently and a sector that appears undervalued and will continue to fall in value
in the short-term. This kind of distinction is exactly what the momentum consideration provides. However, we are
keen on ensuring that this consideration plays a complementary role in the investment strategy, with CAPE clearly
being the dominant part.
The best way to understand our strategy is to think in terms of “investment scores” for each of the three sectors
under consideration. We start from an equally weighted allocation between the three sectors and allocate each of
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the three sectors a score of 2.70 For the sector with the highest Relative CAPE indicator, we subtract 1 from the
respective sector’s score. In contrast, we add 1 to the score of the sector with the lowest Relative CAPE indicator.
This leaves us with an ordering of scores from 1 through 3 that is determined by the Relative CAPE indicator and
that overweights the sector that is identified by the indicator as undervalued and underweights the sector that the
indicator points to as the relatively most overvalued.
Now, we look at the momentum of each of the three sectors, as the percentage change in the real total return
price of a sector over the past four quarters. If a sector’s momentum is the lowest among the three for at least two
consecutive quarters, this sector’s score will be set to zero, concluding the second and final step of the allocation
process. To determine the weights of the sectors from the allocation scores, we simply divide the score of each of the
three sectors by the sum of the scores of the sectors for this rebalancing date.
We would like to point out that there are two ways, by which we disadvantage the momentum step compared to
the CAPE step. First, the momentum reduction, if any, eliminates one sector, but leaves the weight difference that
the comparison of the Relative CAPE indicator introduces between the remaining two sectors unchanged. In that
sense, the predominant impact on portfolio weights comes from the Relative CAPE indicator, leaving a subsidiary
role to the momentum consideration. Second, it is not even the case that there is a momentum reduction in each
and every step. Only under certain circumstances, we implement a momentum reduction at all. One way to think
about our requirement that a sector is the worst momentum-performer for two consecutive quarters in a row before a
score reduction is applied is as a “probationary phase”. If a sector has the worst momentum, it is put on “momentum
probation” and will lose 1 score if its momentum is still comparatively the worst. If however the order of the sectors
in terms of their momentum changes from one quarter to the next, its “probation” is lifted and another sector enters
into its “probationary phase”.
Observe the specific way in which we make use of momentum. Normally and classically, the momentum variable
serves as a sorting criterion for individual stocks that has direct portfolio implications as determining a long-portfolio,
which may be complemented by a short-portfolio of the worst momentum-performers, an idea that has been put
forward by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Daniel (2011) provides evidence for the long-term success of momentum-
based investing, but also finds evidence for the skewness of the distribution of momentum-based investment returns,
as there are few instances, in which the strategy exhibits substantial crashes. Asness et al. (2012) as well as Fama
and French (2012) further substantiate the generality of the momentum idea, with the latter two also considering
international evidence as well as other asset classes.71Asness et al. (2012) and Fama and French (2012) actually do not
just look at momentum in isolation, but consider it in conjunction with a value-based investment approach, an idea
that has also been employed by Asness (1997). What is however common to these analyses, particularly in Asness
et al. (2012) and Fama and French (2012), is the approach to construct portfolios based on each of the two effects
in isolation, which are then subsequently aggregated linearly into a common portfolio. This is different from our
approach that explicitly incorporates a value-based metric, which is then corrected by a momentum-characteristic,
leading to a non-linear, two-step aggregation of the two effects. We explicitly use momentum as a secondary variable,
acting on assets, sectors in this case, that have already undergone a value-based manipulation. As a one-sided variable,
with low momentum leading to elimination, we use it more for its corrective ability than for its portfolio selection
ability.
Moreover, we deviate from the classic construction of momentum portfolios, as pursued in all of the above ref-
erences, that operates on the level of individual assets, which are then combined into portfolios. In contrast, we
apply our momentum-consideration at the level of sectors directly. This approach bears similarity to the analysis in
Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2006), who also consider momentum on an aggregate level, in their case on the level of
country indices and not sectors of the US sectors economy as presented here. The sector-based approach also bears
resemblance to the argument in Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and Scowcroft and Sefton (2005) that characterize
70The choice of an equally weighted allocation as the starting point is necessitated by our lack of information about the sectors’ market
capitalization.
71Novy-Marx (2012) also considers a wide range of countries as well as asset classes in his analysis of momentum-like features of asset
returns. Importantly however, he breaks with the convention to look at returns that span a time period that lasts right until the time of
the portfolio sort (or a single month prior to the sorting time), but looks at returns as measured until six months prior to the portfolio
sort.
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Figure 32: This figure shows the performance of three different portfolio strategies on a log-scale. Investment
commences in the beginning of the first quarter of 1903. Rebalancing quarterly, all three strategies end in the
beginning of the first quarter of 2013. The strategy represented by a dashed black line invests into the S&P Composite
Index at each rebalancing date, which we consider as our main benchmark. The second benchmark, marked as a
dotted blue line, is an equally weighted strategy that puts a weight of one third into each of the three sectors at each
rebalancing date. Finally, the solid red line represents the CAPE-based sector strategy as outlined in Section 6.
momentum as an industry-effect by isolating the characteristics of the individual assets from industry-wide effects.
In contrast, by applying the momentum-consideration on the sector-level directly, we omit this attribution and focus
on the industry/sector effect directly. By doing so, our application of the momentum effect is actually very close
in spirit to Moskowitz et al. (2012), who do not pursue the classic momentum-based portfolio sort but look at the
momentum of an individual asset to determine its impact on this specific asset’s future returns.
8.2 Performance of the Hypothetical Investment Strategy
We will begin the investigation of our historical, hypothetical investment strategy in the first quarter of 1903. The
allocation of this quarter will be determined by valuation measures complemented by the aforementioned momentum
consideration at the end of the fourth quarter of 1902. Rebalancing quarterly, the last quarter, during which we
take a look at the performance of our hypothetical strategy is the fourth quarter of 2012 according to valuation and
momentum rankings as of the end of the third quarter of 2012. As benchmarks, we report both the performance of
the overall stock market, also in cumulative inflation-adjusted total return levels as well as the performance of an
equally weighted strategy that puts a weight of one third on each of the three sectors at each rebalancing date.
As it becomes evident from Figure 32, the hypothetical CAPE-based rotation between Industrials, Utilities, and
Railroads leads to consistently higher levels of cumulative, inflation-adjusted capital almost throughout the entire
time period under investigation. It is the period until the 1940s, in which our strategy tracks either of the two
benchmarks fairly closely, only to substantially outperform these thereafter.
Not looking at the performance in log-scale but in terms of money obtained, an investment into our simplistic
sector-rotation strategy based only on the three sectors turns $1 in the beginning of the fourth quarter of 1902 into
approximately $1, 756 in the beginning of the first quarter of 2013. In comparison, an investment into the S&P
Composite turns $1 into approximately $569 over the same time horizon. If, in contrast to a benchmark like the S&P
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Table 3: This table shows the performance statistics when one limits the time horizon under consideration. The first
column reports the statistics derived from the performance of the strategies as displayed in Figure 32. The second and
third column change the start date of the analysis, leaving the end date fixed at the beginning of the third quarter
of 2012, which is the end of the overall sample. The fourth quarter of 1935 refers to the first quarter, at which we
use data from S&P resources only, and the second quarter of 1962 is the quarter that allows us to single out the final
fifty years of the dataset. The rows refer to different strategies, with our hypothetical strategy located in the top
row and the two benchmarks located below. Each cell contains the annualized, inflation-adjusted total return, the
annualized volatility as derived from the inflation-adjusted total return series, and the ratio of return and volatility,
which is referred to as Information Ratio.
Composite that is weighted according to market value, one considers an equally weighted benchmark, which simply
allocates evenly across the three sectors under consideration at each rebalancing date, $1 grows to about $856, less
than half of the amount accrued by the CAPE-based strategy.
Figure 3 has displayed the inflation-adjusted total return performance of the three sectors. As it has become evi-
dent, the Industrials sector has been the sector with the best performance among the three. Analyzing an investment
into this one sector alone in connection with the performance of our sector-rotation strategy, the Industrials sector
would turn $1 in the beginning of the fourth quarter of 1902 into approximately $1, 463 (as usual, inflation-adjusted)
in the beginning of the first quarter of 2013, which would still fall short by almost $300 compared to the perfor-
mance of our rotation-strategy. Moreover, by relying solely on one sector, an investor would have exposed herself to
substantial non-diversification risk, which is by definition much less strong in the allocation that the sector-rotation
induces.
The outlined investment performance of our strategy translates into an inflation-adjusted, annualized, compounded
total return of about 7.01%, compared to approximately 5.92% for the S&P Composite and 6.32% of the equally
weighted benchmark. With annual volatility of about 20.52%, it follows that our rotation strategy’s information ratio
is approximately 34.17%, which exceeds the information ratio of the S&P Composite by nearly five percentage points
(20.15% volatility and 29.39% information ratio for this benchmark) and the information ratio of the equally weighted
benchmark by slightly more than three percentage points (20.42% volatility for the equally weighted strategy leading
to an information ratio of 30.93%).
When limiting, analogous to Tables 1 and 2, the time horizon under consideration to start farther into the sample,
while leaving the end of the performance analysis unchanged (which is the beginning of the third quarter of 2012
in this case), a consistent picture of the outperformance of our simplistic strategy arises. It actually turns out that
the outperformance compared to the market benchmark becomes even stronger as we limit the time horizon under
consideration, leading up to more than 180 basis points of outperformance, which translates into an almost 14%
higher information ratio.
Focusing again on the longest time interval for the analysis of our hypothetical investment strategy, Figure 33
displays the portfolio weights that our rotation strategy allocates to the three underlying sectors at each rebalancing
date. The weight on the Industrials sector appears at the top in red, the weight on Utilities is depicted in blue
in the middle, and the weight on Railroads is green at the bottom of the figure. In the beginning of the analyzed
time period, our strategy tends to overweight Industrials, only to underweight this sector in the 1910s. During the
1920s, and in particular before the 1929 stock market crash, the Relative CAPE indicator initially causes the strategy
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Figure 33: This figure depicts the portfolio weights for the investment strategy that rotates between Industrials, Util-
ities, and Railroads according to the sectors’ Relative CAPE indicator, supplemented by a momentum consideration,
as outlined in Section 8. Each time series starts at the end of the fourth quarter of 1902 and runs until the end of the
third quarter of 2012. Their frequency is quarterly. The top graph corresponds to the Industrials sector, the middle
one to the Utilities sector, and the bottom one to the Railroads sector.
to underweight the Utilities sector, whereas Railroads are eliminated by the momentum consideration. Despite the
dramatic peak in the CAPE ratio for the Utilities sector in the late 1920s, as shown in Figure 4, the Industrials
sector turns out to be more overvalued in the years immediately preceding 1929, as its CAPE ratio increases faster
in a shorter period of time compared to the Utilities sector. However, at the onset of the 1929 stock market crash,
Utilities are the most overvalued, resulting in it being underweighted until the middle of the 1930s. Another period
of underweighting the Utilities sector starts - subsequent to a period of an underweight Industrials sector between
the mid-1930s and the mid-1940s - in the very late 1940s until the mid-1960s. What follows is an almost thirty-
year period of the Railroads sector not being considered very favorably by the Relative CAPE indicator and also
by the additional momentum-consideration. In the mid-1990s, the Relative CAPE indicator starts picking up the
overvaluation from the technology boom, which impacts the Industrials sector. It then takes until the middle of the
2000s for the Industrials sector to appear more favorably. During the final quarters of the sample, the Industrials
sector is the most favored sector by the Relative CAPE indicator, followed by the Utilities sector, and lastly by the
Railroads sector.
Figure 34 assesses the excess performance of the sector-based sector rotation strategy compared to the equally
weighted as well as the market benchmark. It does so by splitting the sample period into non-overlapping five-year
periods, positioning the intervals such that the end of the sample period (beginning of the first quarter of 2013)
coincides with the end of a five-year interval. In consequence, the last interval captures the five-year period between
the beginning of the first quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2013, whereas the previous interval goes back to the
beginning of the first quarter of 2003.72 All displayed returns are non-annualized. The left hand side of the figure
focuses on the comparison of the rotation strategy to the equally weighted benchmark, whereas the right hand side
focuses on the comparison of the rotation strategy to the benchmark. The two top panels display the actual five-year
total returns, whereas the bottom panels show differences.
72This procedure leads to a single quarter in the very beginning of the sample not being included in any five-year interval.
8 A HYPOTHETICAL STRATEGY BASED ON THE RELATIVE CAPE INDICATOR 57
























































































































Figure 34: This figure displays the long-term performance of the hypothetical rotation strategy as compared to the
equally weighted benchmark (left two panels) and to the benchmark (right two panels). The time period between the
beginning of the fourth quarter of 1902 and the beginning of the first quarter of 2013 is split into non-overlapping
five-year intervals, with the very first quarter not being included in any five-year interval. The return numbers
are inflation-adjusted, net total return quantities, which are not annualized. They are derived from the time series
displayed in Figure 32. The top panels display the returns for both the strategy as well as the respective benchmark,
whereas the bottom panels display the difference.
From the difference bar charts, it becomes apparent that the outperformance of our hypothetical rotation strategy
is not concentrated in a particular time period, but is actually fairly consistent throughout the entire time period
under investigation. Expectedly, there are five-year periods, in which the performance of our rotation strategy
falls short of one or even both of the benchmarks, but other time periods convincingly compensate for this lower
performance and lead to the overall performance pattern that Figure 32 conveys. It is moreover worth emphasizing
how the most dramatic underperformance periods come about, e.g. the difference to the equally weighted strategy
during the periods starting in 1922 and 1982 as well as the difference to the benchmark during the period starting
in 1932 and also in 1982. It is not the case that our rotation strategy performs negatively, whereas the comparison
strategies strive. In contrast, it is actually the case that both strategies under comparison perform very well in each
of the mentioned time periods, as evidenced by the top panels, but that the rotation strategy performs slightly less
impressively.
By the nature of the long-term focus that our valuation measure, the Relative CAPE indicator, has, it is completely
natural to expect a more cautious portfolio approach that will of course impede performance when markets are soaring.
However, it will also guarantee more stable performance during times of market decline, as evidenced for example by
the outperformance after the burst of the technology bubble around the turn of the twentieth century.
As a final piece of information to assess the performance of our sector rotation strategy compared to the S&P
Composite as well as compared to the equally weighted benchmark, we consider what we term an “outperformance
ratio”. For various time horizons, ranging from 1 quarter to 40 quarters, we look at rolling, and therefore necessarily
overlapping, time periods. For each of the different time horizons, we count the number of times that our strategy
outperforms the benchmark for the rolling time periods of fixed length. This results in an outperformance ratio
associated with a specific time horizon. As our strategy is supposed to capture long-term value, we expect the out-
performance ratio to be an increasing function of the length of the time period over which performance is considered.
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Excess Return of Rotation Strategy over Benchmark if Rotation Strategy Outperforms
Excess Return of Benchmark over Rotation Strategy if Benchmark Outperforms
Figure 35: This figure provides additional information about the performance of our hypothetical rotation strategy
when compared to the market benchmark. The top panel computes a ratio that we refer to as “outperformance ratio”.
For a fixed time horizon, it measures the number of times that our rotation strategy outperforms the benchmark over
that time horizon. The first count occurs at the beginning of the sample, which is the beginning of the fourth quarter
of 1902, and the last count ends with the beginning of the first quarter of 2013. We assess the outperformance for the
fixed time horizon, where we look at overlapping time-periods for different outperformance assessments. One fixed
time interval results in a single ratio and the plot in the top panel displays the ratio against the time horizon used
for the ratio calculation. The bottom panel measures the associated conditional outperformance. For each fixed time
horizon, the performance difference (difference in non-annualized, real total return) between the rotation strategy
and the benchmark is attributed to the black solid line when the rotation strategy outperforms and to the red dashed
line when the rotation strategy underperforms. (The red dashed line measures the excess of the benchmark over
the rotation strategy) After having considered all overlapping time intervals for a fixed time horizon, we average the
excess returns in the two groups geometrically and annualize the result to enable comparisons across time horizons.
Both panels display the resulting quantities for varying time horizons, ranging from 1 quarter to 40 quarters.
This is indeed what the black line in the top graph of Figure 35 displays. Whereas for very short time horizons, our
strategy outperforms the benchmark only slightly more than 50% of the time, this ratio increases fairly consistently
to approximately two thirds for the longest time period considered, which looks at rolling 10-year windows.
The bottom panel aims to address the potential concern that, although its outperformance ratio is increasing,
our rotation strategy still does not outperform the benchmark around 30% of the time, even over a time period of
10 years. The two lines in the bottom graph therefore measure average conditional excess returns. The black line
captures the conditional excess return of the sector rotation over the benchmark within those rolling time-windows,
in which it actually outperforms the benchmark. This series of excess returns associated with a fixed time horizon
is then geometrically averaged and the result is annualized to allow for comparisons across different time horizons.
The resulting excess return quantity is then plotted against the length of the time horizon under consideration.
Analogously, the red line captures the conditional outperformance of the benchmark over the rotation strategy, i.e.
the shortfall in performance of our strategy against the length of the rolling time windows. Two properties become
apparent with regard to these conditional excess returns. First, both curves decrease as the length of the time horizon
increases. This means that the performance profile becomes more stable, as the outperformance in each direction gets
less extreme, with increases in the time horizon, over which performance is measured.73 This effect is to be expected,
73It is important to keep in mind that we have annualized the return differences (after averaging) to make excess returns comparable
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Figure 36: This figure is analogous to Figure 35. It does however not compare the performance of the CAPE-based
sector rotation to the market benchmark, but to the equally weighted benchmark.
as a longer-term focus ought to result in a more stable return profile. Second, it is crucial to note that the black line,
referring to the conditional excess return of the sector allocation strategy consistently exceeds the red line, referring
to those instances, in which the benchmark outperforms. That is, it is not only true that our strategy outperforms
the benchmark more often, as evidenced by the top graph, but also that the outperformance of the sector allocation
strategy is higher than the underperformance during times, in which the benchmark has higher returns. Moreover,
during the longest time horizons, where the outperformance ratio actually falls slightly from above 70% to below 70%,
one can clearly see that the associated excess return markedly picks up, i.e. the conditional discrepancy compensates
for the drop in the outperformance ratio.
Figure 36 shows an analogous plot to Figure 35, performing a comparison between our rotation strategy and
the equally weighted benchmark. One observes a very similar pattern, in that the outperformance ratio increases
from slightly more than 50% to nearly 70%, accompanied by the conditional excess return of the CAPE-based sector
allocation strategy consistently exceeding the conditional excess return of the benchmark.
9 Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we have constructed a record of price, dividend, and earnings
indices from primary sources - Cowles (1939) as well as various editions of the Standard & Poor’s Security Price
Index Record and the Standard & Poor’s Analysts’ Handbook - starting in the early 1870s and ending in the end of
the year 2012.
This data has enabled us to investigate the valuation of the US stock market for almost 130 years74 on the more
granular level of sectors and has additionally given us the opportunity to consider the relative valuation of these
components, which is the second contribution of this paper. The CAPE ratio has not only proven to be effective in
the prediction of the performance of the sectors individually, but has also the potential to assess the relative return
across different time horizons.
74The full sample captures about 140 years of data, which results in about 130 years of data for the CAPE ratio, as this ratio requires
ten years of earnings. As the Relative CAPE indicator involves twenty years of history of the CAPE ratio, our investment strategy only
covers about 110 years.
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performance across sectors, based on differences in the Relative CAPE indicator. Building on comparisons of the
Relative CAPE indicator across sectors, we have devised a hypothetical, historical investment strategy overweighting
the sector with the lowest Relative CAPE indicator and underweighting the one with the highest indicator. The only
additional ingredient, which we construct to be of subsidiary importance compared to the CAPE-based weighting,
is the elimination of a sector based on a momentum consideration, which is necessary because of the so-called value
trap.
Finally, on methodological grounds, we extend the definition of the Cycically Adjusted Price-Earnings (CAPE)
ratio to not only account for inflationary effects that occur because of the consideration of a long-term earnings
history, but also to correct for effects from corporate payout policy. Moreover, our construction of the Relative
CAPE indicator is necessary to use a long-term valuation measure based on the CAPE ratio to perform comparisons
across assets.
Our results using over a hundred years of data are consistent with the notion that major sectors of the stock
market show frequent mispricings that can be exploited in an investment strategy that generally leads to better
results than holding the market portfolio. Entire sectors do appear to go through short periods of mispricing as
suggested by behavioral theories. The durations of these periods of mispricing are often measured in just a few years
- requiring continued vigilance for sector allocations to achieve better returns.
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A Construction Details for Price, Dividend, and Earnings Data
A.1 Overview of Data Sources
Tables 4 and 5 provide a detailed record of the data sources used to construct the nominal price, dividend, and
earnings series that, as emphasized in Section 2, form the basis for our later analysis of the overall stock market, the
Industrials sector, the Utilities sector, as well as of the Railroads sector. They allow for the construction of a quarterly
price series in the beginning and the end of each quarter, a quarterly dividend series, and an earnings series, which
is annual until the end of 1935 and quarterly thereafter. Details of the construction follow in subsequent sections.
In principle, three data sources are involved in the construction of our data. For the first part of our sample until
the mid-1920s for prices and earnings and until the 1930s for dividends, we rely on Cowles (1939). Thereafter, we
switch to the Standard & Poor’s Security Price Index Record and rely on its information as long as it is provided.
For prices, this enables us to use data until the latest publication of this record, which is the 2010 publication. For
dividends and earnings, we need to switch to the Standard & Poor’s Analysts’ Handbook for dividends and earnings
information of Railroads starting in 1982 and for the overall stock market as well as the remaining two sectors in the
fourth quarter of 2001.
A.2 Prices
Cowles (1939) provides a monthly time series, referred to as series P, between December 187275 and December 1938
for the overall stock market as well as for the three sectors under consideration.76 Importantly, it needs to be kept
in mind that the price data from Cowles (1939) is computed as the simple average between the low and the high
price for the month.77 For the beginning-of-month series, we use the monthly price for the beginning of the quarter
and for the end-of-month series the monthly price reported in the last month of the quarter. Given the reporting
convention of averaging the high and low price of the month, we are aware that both of these numbers have to be
taken as approximations.78
75As already mentioned in Section 2, the price data actually starts in January 1871 already. Because the first uniform earnings
observation across the overall stock market and the three sectors under consideration does not occur until the end of the year 1872, we
disregard the first 23 monthly price observations.
76Because of World War I, Cowles (1939) does not report any price data between August and November 1914, as the New York Stock
Exchange was closed during that time. This also affects the total return indices that we, as decsribed in the next section, use for the
construction of the dividend series. In consequence, there is no observation at the end of the third quarter of 1914 as well as in the
beginning of the fourth quarter of 1914. With regard to the dividend series, we observe an unusually high dividend for the overall stock
market, the Industrials, the Utilities, as well as the Railroads sector at the end of the fourth quarter of 1914, which leads us to assume
that this dividend captures both the third and the fourth quarter of 1914, with reinvestment occuring at the end of the fourth quarter of
1914. With regard to the later investment strategy, we simply omit the beginning of the fourth quarter of 1914 as a rebalancing date and
preserve the allocation from the beginning of the third quarter of 1914. In contrast, the actual evolution of the capital for any strategy
is averaged geometrically to fill in the missing value in the third quarter of 1914. Finally, as it will become apparent in the subsequent
section on earnings, the earnings information from Cowles (1939) is annual, whose reporting is therefore not affected by the closure of the
New York Stock Exchange between August and November.
77See page 17 of Cowles (1939).
78Wilson and Jones (2002), focusing on the overall stock market data, suggest a correction of the averaged monthly series to reflect
end-of-month information more accurately. For this purpose, they rely on accompanying information from the Dow index. We have
decided not to follow their procedure, as it relies on the assumption that the different samples underlying the Cowles (1939) and later on
Standard Statistics data follow nearly identical price paths, which is not verifiable. Therefore, the magnitude of the approximation error
by using the averaged monthly Cowles (1939) can, in our view, not be sensibly compared to the approximation error that their analysis
introduces. Moreover, their analysis only applies to the overall stock market and does not provide any guidance on how to proceed for
the sector data that we consider.






Time Period and Source
Prices December 1872 - December 1938: Cowles (1939)
January 1926 - December 1931: Security Price Index Record 1980 [weekly data]
January 1932 - December 2001: Security Price Index Record 2002 [only until September
2001 for Utilities]
January 2000 - December 2001: Security Price Index Record 2006 [only for Utilities]
January 2002 - December 2007: Security Price Index Record 2008
January 2008 - December 2009: Security Price Index Record 2010
January 2010 - January 2013: Bloomberg
Dividends Q1 1873 - Q4 1934: Cowles (1939)
Q1 1935 - Q3 2001: Security Price Index Record 2002
Q1 1996 - Q3 1999: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for December 1999
Q4 1999 - Q3 2001: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for December 2001
Q4 2001 - Q1 2005: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for June 2005
Q2 2005 - Q3 2008: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for December 2008
Q4 2008 - Q1 2012: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for June 2012
Q2 2012 - Q4 2012: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for January 2013
Earnings 1872 - 1925: Cowles (1939)
1926 - 1934: Security Price Index Record 2002
Q1 1935 - Q3 2001: Security Price Index Record 2002
Q4 2001 - Q1 2005: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for June 2005
Q2 2005 - Q3 2008: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for December 2008
Q4 2008 - Q2 2012: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for September 2012
Table 4: This table lists the resources used for the construction of the nominal time series for prices (both for the
beginning-of-the-quarter and the end-of-the-quarter series), dividends, and earnings, as referred to in Section 2.1 for
the overall stock market, for the Industrials sector, and for the Utilities sector. “Security Price Index Record” refers
to the appropriate volume of Standard and Poor’s Statistical Service (1978-2010), whereas “Analysts’ Handbook” is
a reference to Standard and Poor’s Statistical Service (1982-2012). The information for the price series is quoted
monthly for ease of reference. Ultimately, we construct two quarterly price series, a beginning-of-quarter series and
an end-of-quarter series. The quarterly dividend information from Cowles (1939) is not readily available but needs
to be inferred from price return and total return information therein. There is an overlap between January 1926 and
December 1938 in the price data that is used to re-base the data from Cowles (1939) to match it with the S&P data.
Another overlap in the price series occurs for the Utilities sector between January 2000 and September 2001, which
is needed to re-base the S&P information after September 2001 to match it with the prior information.




Time Period and Source
Prices December 1872 - December 1938: Cowles (1939)
January 1926 - December 1931: Security Price Index Record 1980 [weekly data until end
of 1929]
January 1932 - December 1975: Security Price Index Record 2002
January 1976 - December 1985: Security Price Index Record 1986 [middle of first week for
beginning of month, middle of last week for end of month, proper month end since 1983]
January 1986 - December 1989: Security Price Index Record 1992 [middle of first week
for beginning of month, proper month end for end of month]
January 1990 - December 1995: Security Price Index Record 1996
January 1996 - December 2001: Security Price Index Record 2001
January 2000 - December 2003: Security Price Index Record 2004
January 2004 - December 2007: Security Price Index Record 2008
January 2008 - December 2009: Security Price Index Record 2010
January 2010 - January 2013: Bloomberg
Dividends Q1 1873 - Q4 1934: Cowles (1939)
Q1 1935 - Q4 1981: Security Price Index Record 2002
Q1 1982 - Q3 1984: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for December 1984
Q4 1984 - Q1 1988: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for June 1988
Q2 1988 - Q3 1991: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for December 1991
Q4 1991 - Q2 1995: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for September 1995
Q3 1995 - Q1 1999: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for June 1999
Q2 1999 - Q3 2001: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for December 2001
Q4 2001 - Q4 2002: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for March 2003
Q1 2003 - Q3 2006: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for December 2006
Q4 2006 - Q2 2010: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for September 1995
Q3 2010 - Q1 2012: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for June 2012
Q2 2012 - Q4 2012: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for January 2013
Earnings 1872 - 1925: Cowles (1939)
1926 - 1934: Security Price Index Record 2002
Q1 1935 - Q4 1981: Security Price Index Record 2002
Q1 1982 - Q3 1984: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for December 1984
Q4 1984 - Q1 1988: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for June 1988
Q2 1988 - Q3 1991: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for December 1991
Q4 1991 - Q2 1995: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for September 1995
Q3 1995 - Q1 1999: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for June 1999
Q2 1999 - Q3 2001: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for December 2001
Q4 2001 - Q4 2002: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for March 2003
Q1 2003 - Q3 2006: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for December 2006
Q4 2006 - Q2 2010: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for September 1995
Q3 2010 - Q2 2012: Analysts’ Handbook, Monthly Supplement for September 2012
Table 5: This table is the analogue of Table 4, describing the data sources used for the construction of the price,
dividends, and earnings data of the Railroads sector. Conventions are identical to those used for Table 4. The same
price overlaps exist as for the Utilities sector in Table 4.
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Starting in 1926, we obtain price data from Standard and Poor’s Statistical Service (1978-2010). When construct-
ing the beginning-of-month series as well as the end-of-month series, we use spot prices taken from the end of business
days, moving away from the averaging convention in Cowles (1939). For the overall stock market as well as for the
Industrials and the Utilities sector, this amounts to using price data from the first business day of the first month
of a quarter for the beginning-of-quarter series and data from the last business day of the last month of a quarter
for the end-of-quarter series. Prior to 1932, we only have access to data from Wednesday of each week. In this case,
we use the first Wednesday of a quarter for the beginning-of-quarter series and the last Wednesday of a quarter for
the end-of-quarter series. The situation for the Railroads sector bears two differences. First, we only have to rely on
weekly data between 1926 and 1929, as the daily price series for this sector starts already in 1930. However, for a
period between 1979 and 1989, we have only been able to uncover weekly data together with end-of-month informa-
tion between 1983 and 1989. We were therefore forced to rely on data from Wednesdays for the beginning-of-quarter
series between 1979 and 1989 and for the end-of-quarter series between 1979 and 1983.
The price series undergoes one re-basing for the overal stock market and the Industrials sector and a total of two
re-basing operations for Utilities and Railroads. A re-basing that is common to all occurs between the data from
Cowles (1939) and the information provided in the Security Price Index Record starting in 1926. In each of the four
cases, for the overall stock market as well as the three sectors, we take monthly data from Cowles (1939) between
January 1926 and December 1938 together with data from the end of the month from the Security Price Index Record
for the same time period and compute the mean of the ratio. This mean is then used to scale the data from Cowles
(1939). The merged series contains data from Cowles (1939) until the end of 1925 and data from the Security Price
Index Record thereafter. The second re-basing only affects the Utilities and the Railroads sector, for which Standard
& Poor’s rebases their indices around 2000. Between January 2000 and September 2001, we take data from both
the beginning of each month and the end of each month and again compute the mean of the ratio between the two
series. After scaling the latter part of the sample, we use the earlier data until September 2001 when we switch to
the re-scaler information.
In a final step, we re-scale all merged series (beginning-of-quarter as well as end-of-quarter), so that the value of
the nominal end-of-quarter index in the beginning of the sample (December 1872) is equal to $1.
A.3 Dividends
The purpose of the dividend series for the overall stock markets as well as for the Industrials, the Utilities, and the
Railroads sector is to construct total return indices from the price indices, whose construction is described above.79
Because of this, it is essential that the dividend series matches the frequency of the price indices (both the beginning-
and the end-of-quarter series), which is quarterly. Unfortunately, the frequency of the dividend data that Cowles
(1939) provides explicitly is annual, which is why we have to infer the dividend information from the interplay between
the monthly price index, referred to as series P in Cowles (1939), and the monthly total return index, referred to as
series C in Cowles (1939).
Explicitly, consider a generic sector and denote the price index in month t by Pt, the dividend accrued between










which enables us to infer the dividend for month t + 1. We obtain monthly dividend data from January 1873
(prices from Cowles, at least as far as we consider them, start in December 1872) until December 1934. In contrast to
the price and earnings data, we do not switch to the Security Price Index Record in 1926, as this source only provides
annual dividend information between 1926 and 1934 that, as mentioned above, is inappropriate for our purposes. As
the underlying stock universe of Cowles (1939) is designed to match the universe of stocks in the Security Price Index
Record closely in the 1930s80, we are confident that the more frequent dividend observations from Cowles (1939) will
nearly accurately reflect the actual occurrences referenced in the Security Price Index Record.
79For the construction procedure of the total return indices, see Section 2.
80See our discussion on Section 2.
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We aggregate the monthly dividend information into quarterly numbers and then apply the re-basing factor of
the Cowles data that has been constructed from overlapping price data, as described in the previous section.
Starting in 1935, we use dividend information from the Security Price Index Record that is however reported
as 12-month trailing sums. In order to properly disaggregate these 12-month sums into quarterly information, we
rely on accompanying information from the monthly supplements of the Analysts’ Handbook, which provides actual
quarterly dividends starting in 1996. Using these quarterly numbers, we are able to infer the actual quarterly dividend
observations from the 12-month sums all the way back from 1996 until 1935. Importantly, this kind of procedure
does not introduce any kind of forward-looking bias, as it does not introduce any new information, but merely serves
as a disaggregating device for existing information.
As a second-to-last manipulation, it is necessary to point out that the re-basing for Utilities and Railroads around
2000 also needs to be imposed on the dividends, using the factor derived from price data. Finally, the dividend series
for the entire sample period needs to be scaled to reflect the normalization of the price at the end of fourth quarter
1972 to $1.
A.4 Earnings
From 1871 until 1925, earnings come from Cowles (1939). Observations are annual and refer to 12-month trailing
sums. In reporting the earnings data, Cowles (1939) differentiates between the overall set of companies that are
incorporated in the price data (series P for index data as well as series C for total return data) and a smaller set
of companies, for whom earnings information is available to construct sector earnings indices. For ease of reference,
Cowles (1939) provides annual price averages (matching the frequency of the earnings data) data for both the overall
set of companies as well as for the set of companies incorporated in the earnings series. This enables us to construct
an approximation to the earnings of the overall set of companies by multiplying an annual earnings observation by
the ratio of the price average of the overall set divided by the average of the smaller set of companies with earnings
data.81
The earnings data from Cowles (1939) is then scaled to re-base it to the level of the data from the Security Index
Record, using the re-basing factor derived from the price data as described above.
The earnings data after 1926 comes from the Security Price Index Record and is later complemented by information
from the Analysts’ Handbook, according to the information provided in Tables 4 and 5. It comes from the earnings
per share series that is adjusted to the price index.82 Whereas the observations 1926 until 1934 are annual, the
frequency switches to quarterly in 1935. We employ the actual quarterly series that we subsequently aggregate into
12-month trailing sums. The Security Price Index Record provides both actual quarterly earnings numbers and
12-month trailing sums. However, Standard & Poor’s emphasizes in the Security Price Index Record83 that for the
period 1935-41, the 12-month trailing sums are based on annual earnings of the companies in the index at the end
of each quarter. In order to avoid this unnecessary imprecision, we have decided to aggregate quarterly earnings
numbers and to consistently apply this convention thorughout the entire time period, for which we rely on S&P data.
As with the dividend data, two final manipulations need to be addressed. First, the re-basing for Utilities and
Railroads around 2000 also needs to be imposed on the earnings for these two sectors, using the factor derived from
the relevant price data. Finally, the earnings series for the entire sample period again needs to be scaled to reflect
the normalization of the price of the respective sector (as well as for the price of the overall stock market in the case
of the overall market data) at the end of fourth quarter 1972 to $1.
81Shiller (1992) applies the same procedure for the overall market data from Cowles (1939). The ratio of annual earnings and the annual
average of price data for the companies with earnings is also referred to as series R in Cowles (1939). Shiller (1992) then multiplies the
R series by the annual average of the P series, which is exactly the same operation as described in the text.
82Comparing the earnings numbers in the Security Price Index Record to the reported numbers in the Analysts’ Handbook, it turns out
that the earnings numbers are diluted earnings per share number, an information that the Security Price Index Record does not provide
explicitly.
83See, for example, page 462 in the 2004 volume of Standard and Poor’s Statistical Service (1978-2010).
B CONSTRUCTION DETAILS FOR THE DENOMINATOR OF THE CAPE RATIO 68
B Construction Details for the Denominator of the CAPE Ratio
This section relates to Section 4.1 and deals with an unaddressed detail concerning the selection of the earnings
observations that enter the CAPE ratio. The problem is that our earnings observations change frequency in the
beginning of 1935. 12-month earnings numbers are annual up to and including 1935 and quarterly afterwards. This
issue is further complicated by the fact that we impose a six-month lag on the earnings observations, in order to
address the look-ahead problem.
To address this issue, we therefore distinguish between three cases in the construction of the denominator of the
CAPE ratio. At the end of each quarter up to and including the second quarter of 1936, we solely rely on the annual
earnings observations from Cowles (1939) to compute a CAPE ratio, applying the same procedure as outlined for
the pre-1935 period in Section 4.2. For this part of the sample, this procedure implies that the earnings lag that
we impose varies between six months (for a CAPE computation at the end of the second quarter of a year) and 15
months (for a CAPE computation at the end of the first quarter of a year). Clearly, the limited availability of the
earnings data necessitates what we have just outlined. However, the impact of the varying lag is limited by the fact
that the maximum lag (15 months) is close to only a tenth of the total time period, over which we consider earnings
(10 years).
For any CAPE number computed from the third quarter of 1936 until the second quarter of 1945, we have to deal
with the transition from annual to quarterly numbers in the year 1935. As an example, consider the earnings numbers
for the computation in the fourth quarter of 1936. Because of the three-month lag, the first earnings observation
to consider would be from the end of the second quarter of 1936. As this is a 12-month trailing sum, it reaches all
the way back to the beginning of the third quarter of 1935. Now, we cannot use the earnings observation at the
end of the second quarter of 1935, as it reaches well into the year 1934, for which we only have an annual earnings
observation, which would result in double-counting some earnings observation. For this purpose, we have singled
out the quarterly earnings from 1935, have adjusted them for inflation and have individually (at the quarterly level)
scaled them to reflect total returns. Within our example, we add two quarters of these quarterly earnings into the
earnings sum used for the denominator of the CAPE ratio, which gets us to the beginning of the year 1935. Now, we
continue summing 12-month trailing earnings, until we have collected ten 12-month trailing observations. Of course,
this results in ten and a half years of earnings for the denominator of CAPE, which is why we divide the sum of these
earnings by 10.5 instead of 10. In general, it will depend on the quarter of consideration whether we average exactly
ten years of earnings.84
If, instead of a fourth quarter during the period between the third quarter of 1936 and the second quarter of 1945,
we select earnings observations to be used in the computation of the CAPE ratio for a first quarter, we apply an
analogous procedure to the one described above and we end up with 10.75 years of earnings (using observations from
the first through third quarter of 1935). Finally, for a third quarter, we obtain 10.25 years, whereas no adjustment is
necessary at all for any earnings numbers involved in the computation of a second-quarter CAPE ratio between the
third quarter of 1936 and the second quarter of 1945.
C Investment Strategy for Changing Sector Universe
In the main text, we have adhered to the principle of consistency with regard to the sector classification that we use.
We have aimed to provide very long-term evidence for the predictive ability of the CAPE ratio and the derived Relative
CAPE indicator and have translated this evidence into a hypothetical rotation strategy between the Industrials,
Utilities, and Railroads sector from 1902 until 2013. In this section, we would like to emphasize the robustness of our
hypothetical strategy when we actually attempt to incorporate changes in the reporting of top-level sectors of the US
economy.
84Another approach to deal with the change of the frequency of the earnings observation could have been the application of the procedure
pre-1935, as described in the previous paragraph, for another ten years until the full earnings history of the CAPE ratio only refers to
quarterly numbers. This procedure however completely disregards much of the detail of the quarterly earnings observations between the
mid-1930s and the mid-1940s, which we find undesirable.
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For this purpose, we consider the switch of S&P from the reporting of quantities for the Industrials, Utilities, and
Railroads sector to the reporting of numbers for the Industrials, Utilities, Transportation, and Financials sector.85
The Railroads sector hereby becomes a part of the Transportation sector. For the Transportation sector, we use data
from Standard and Poor’s Statistical Service (1978-2010) between 1975 and 2001 and from Bloomberg subsequently
to obtain a time series of the CAPE ratio that starts in the fourth quarter of 1985. Similarly, data from Standard and
Poor’s Statistical Service (1978-2010) and Standard and Poor’s Statistical Service (1982-2012) in conjunction with
price index information from Bloomberg for the most recent years result in the analogous time series for the Financials
sector. Our construction methodology for this valuation ratio are thereby identical to the procedure outlined in Sector
4.
Figure 37 plots the CAPE ratio for the Transportation and the Financials sector together with the appropriately
shortened time series for the original three sectors as well as for the overall stock market, which we repeat from
Figure 4 for ease of comparison. There is quite a similarity between the CAPE ratio of the Transportation sector and
the CAPE ratio of its component, the Railroads sector. Some noteworthy differences arise in the late 2000s, when
Railroads are more overvalued as expressed by their CAPE ratio before their CAPE ratio drops more dramatically.
During the increase in valuation after the turn of the decade, it is then the Transportation sector that rises more
extremely, while the increase in valuation for the Railroads sector is more subdued. The Financials sector’s valuation
increases before the turn of the century, a tendency that is in line with the pattern for the overall stock market
and the Industrials sector, which at that time makes up a substantial portion of the overall market. Its decrease in
valuation is however much less dramatic than for the overall stock market and the Industrials sector. Finally, it is
noteworthy that the Financials sector valuation in the years prior to the 2007-2009 subprime crisis is nt experiencing
any major upwards movement. The crisis itself leads to further drops in valuation, from which the Financials sector
has not recovered until the end of the sample at the end of 2012.
With regard to the calculation of the Relative CAPE indicator for the Transportation and the Financials sector,
we make a minor adjustment to the methodology outlined in Section 5 above. If we required twenty years worth of
observations of the CAPE ratio for the two sectors, we would not be able to make any reasonable inference from the
time series of their Relative CAPE indicators, as we would have less than five years worth of data. We therefore
perform the first calculation for the indicator at the end of the third quarter of 1990 already, with only five years
worth of observations for the respective CAPE ratios.86 The drawback however is the fact that the notion of a
long-term average of the CAPE ratio for the two sectors becomes substantially less meaningful in the presence of a
smaller sample to take the mean over. For any subsequent quarter, we consider a longer and longer sample of the
CAPE ratio to calculate the Relative CAPE indicator over, until we reach the end of the second quarter of 2010,
which is the first quarter with a full twenty years of history for the CAPE ratio.
In terms of the hypothetical investment strategy, we only have to make one minor modification to accommodate
the fact that our rotation considers four sectors instead of three. We start with the same “investment score” of 2 as
in Section 8 at each rebalancing date that involves four sectors. As in Section 8, the score of the one sector with the
lowest Relative CAPE indicator is then raised by 1, whereas we drop the score for the one sector with the highest
Relative CAPE indicator by one. This leaves us with a very similar ordering to that described in Section 8 except
for the fact that there are two “middle” sectors with an unchanged score, in contrast to one in the initial setting.
Subsequently, we apply the same momentum-methodology as in Section 8 with the identical “probationary phase” to
control the impact of the momentum consideration.
The switch from the three-sector rotation to the four-sector rotation occurs with the availability of the Relative
CAPE indicator for the Transportation and the Financials sector, as outlined above. That is, our rotation strategy
rotates between the Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads sector starting with the initial portfolio allocation in the
beginning of the fourth quarter of 1902 up to and including the portfolio rebalancing in the beginning of the third
85Another change in the top-level reporting for sectors of the US economy is the introduction of the GICS classification system in 1999.
As pointed out above, we will neglect this change, as the available data after this change is barely sufficient to calculate a single CAPE
ratio, which consequently renders the consideration of the Relative CAPE indicator and a longer-term history of an investment strategy
infeasible.
86For the sake of completeness, we would like to point out we preserve the winsorization at the 5% level at both the bottom and the
top of the respective samples for the CAPE ratio.
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Figure 37: This figure shows the CAPE ratio for the overall stock market (All Stocks), Industrials, Utilities, Railroads,
Transportation, and Financials. The construction of the CAPE ratio follows section 4. The quarterly time series start
with the fourth quarter of 1985 and end with the second quarter of 2012. For the time period under consideration,
the information in the panels for the overall stock market, the Industrials, the Utilities, and the Railroads sector is
identical to the information from Figure 4, but is included here to simplify the comparison to the Transportation and
the Financial sector.
quarter of 1990. From the rebalancing in the beginning of the fourth quarter of 1990 onwards, the strategy then takes
into account the changed sector universe that then includes the Industrials and Financials sector.87
Figure 39 displays the performance of the rotation strategy, which is very similar to the performance of the original
CAPE-based sector rotation strategy, establishing the robustness of the outlined CAPE-based sector allocation to
the inclusion of changes in the sector classification methodology. The annualized geometric average of the inflation-
adjusted total return of the CAPE-based strategy amounts to 6.59%, which is approximately 40 basis points lower than
the return of the origina strategy, but still nearly 70 basis points annually above the return of the market benchmark,
as measured over a time period of approximately 110 years. The volatility of the CAPE-based strategy at 20.61%
is roughly comparable to that of the market benchmark at 20.15%. Correspondingly, the information ratio of the
rotation strategy exceeds that of the market benchmark by nearly 2.60% (31.95% versus 29.39%). The outperformance
in terms of the information ratio of the CAPE-based sector compared to the equally weighted benchmark remains
about the same as in the original performance comparison at approximately 3%. The annual geometrically averaged
return of this benchmark amounts to 5.99% with an accompanying volatility of 20.66%.
Figure 40, which is analogous to Figure 34, displays the excess returns of the CAPE-based sector rotation strategy
with the sector switch over the benchmark strategies. Focusing on the rightmost comparisons that involve the modified
set of sectors for the rotation, it becomes apparent that the only five-year period, in which the CAPE-based sector
rotation falls somewhat behind either of the benchmarks, is a period, in which both benchmarks perform very well and
the sector rotation just does not quite perform as well, and not a period with opposite return patterns. This evidence
points again to the more careful allocation implied by the long-term focus of the CAPE ratio and the corresponding
Relative CAPE indicator and is very consistent picture with the evidence presented for the original sector rotation.
Finally, Figures 41 and 42 are the analogues of Figures 35 and 36, displaying the outpermance ratio, as defined in
87We impose the same kind of change in the underlying constituents of the strategy for the equally weighted benchmark to preserve the
comparability with the CAPE-based rotation strategy.
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Figure 38: Analogous to the transition from Figure 4 to Figure 13, this figure contains the Relative CAPE indicators
corresponding to the CAPE ratios displayed in Figure 37. The frequency of the observations is again quarterly and
observations cover the time period from the end of the third quarter in 1990 until the end of the fourth quarter of
2012. Relative CAPE in a given quarter for each of the four time series is the ratio of this quarter’s CAPE and a
winsorized, twenty-year average of that time series’ history of CAPE ratios, up to and including the current CAPE
ratio, where the winsorization occurs at the 5% level. The Transportation and the Financials sector do not have
twenty years of history for their respective CAPE ratios until the third quarter of 2004. Before this quarter, we use
whatever time series is available for the normalization of the CAPE ratio (which remains winsorized at the 5% level).
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Figure 39: This figure shows the performance of three different portfolio strategies on a log-scale. Investment
commences in the beginning of the first quarter of 1903. Rebalancing quarterly, all three strategies end in the
beginning of the first quarter of 2013. The strategy represented by a dashed black line invests into the S&P Composite
Index at each rebalancing date, which we consider as our main benchmark. For the equally weighted benchmark,
marked as a dotted blue line, as well as for the CAPE-based sector rotation strategy, displayed as a solid red line,
we utilize the sectors Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads for the rebalancing from the first quarter of 1903 up to
and including the rebalancing in the beginning of the third quarter of 1990 and the sectors Industrials, Utilities,
Transportation, and Financials thereafter until the last rebalancing in the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2012.
The equally weighted benchmark puts equal on each utilized sector during each rebalancing and the CAPE-based
strategy assigns weight according to the procedure outlined in Section C.
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Rotation Strategy and Equally Weighted Strategy
 
 























































Rotation Strategy and Benchmark
 
 




































Figure 40: This figure displays the long-term performance of the hypothetical rotation strategy that initially rotates
between the Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads sectors (up to and including the rebalancing in the beginning of the
third quarter of 1990) and subsequently between the Industrials, Utilities, Transportation and Financials sectors when
compared to the equally weighted benchmark (appropriately reflecting the available sectors at each rebalancing date)
in the left two panels and to the benchmark in the right two panels. The time period between the beginning of the
fourth quarter of 1902 and the beginning of the first quarter of 2013 is split into non-overlapping five-year intervals,
with the very first quarter not being included in any five-year interval. The return numbers are inflation-adjusted,
net total return quantities, which are not annualized. They are derived from the time series displayed in Figure 39.
The top panels display the returns for both the strategy as well as the respective benchmark, whereas the bottom
panels display the difference.
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Performance of Rotation Strategy vs Benchmark
























Conditional Excess Return for Rotation Strategy and Benchmark













Excess Return of Rotation Strategy over Benchmark if Rotation Strategy Outperforms
Excess Return of Benchmark over Rotation Strategy if Benchmark Outperforms
Figure 41: This figure is the analogue of Figure 35 for the CAPE-based Sector Rotation Strategy that initially rotates
between the Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads sector up to and including the rebalancing in the beginning of the
third quarter of 1990 and between the Industrials, Utilities, Transportation, and Financials sector thereafter.
Section 8, as well as the patterns in the annualized conditional outperformance of the CAPE-based sector rotation
strategy when compared to both the market benchmark as well as the equally weighted benchmark. All results
are very similar - to the degree of almost being indistiguishable - to the results presented for the original CAPE-
based sector allocation strategy building on the Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads sector,88 which again provides
evidence for the robustness of the CAPE-based sector allocation methodology with regard to adaptations in the sector
classification.
88Some degree of similarity is of course to be expected, as the two strategies share the same performance from 1902 until 1990.
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Performance of Rotation Strategy vs Equally Weighted Strategy
























Conditional Excess Return for Rotation Strategy and Equally Weighted Strategy













Excess Return of Rotation Strategy over Equally Weighted Strategy if Rotation Strategy Outperforms
Excess Return of Equally Weighted Strategy over Rotation Strategy if Equally Weighted Strategy Outperforms
Figure 42: This figure is the analogue of Figure 36 for the CAPE-based Sector Rotation Strategy that initially rotates
between the Industrials, Utilities, and Railroads sector up to and including the rebalancing in the beginning of the
third quarter of 1990 and between the Industrials, Utilities, Transportation, and Financials sector thereafter. The
same switch occurs for the equally weighted benchmark.
